

# I. Echoes from the American Left



# ***From Aristotle to Adam Smith: What is Left and What is Right?***

An Interview with Noam Chomsky

by Pierre Guerlain

*Noam Chomsky is mostly well-known for his groundbreaking work in linguistics and his political analyses. Chomsky revolutionized the field of linguistics (see his *The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory*, New York, Plenum, 1975 (1955-56)) and became a prominent intellectual and activist in the 1960s when he opposed the war in Vietnam and was put on Nixon's "enemy list." He is a severe critic of academics and intellectual fashions (see *American Power and the New Mandarins*, New York, Pantheon, 1969) and is often critical of all the groups or individuals involved in a conflict. Thus he may have sharp words for the left, the right, liberals and conservatives or Americans, Israelis and Palestinians. In the 1960s he criticized the student activists who were also opposed to the war in Vietnam. His views have often earned him enemies and he has become involved in several political or intellectual controversies. He defines himself as a responsible intellectual and a left libertarian. He has published extensively in the fields of foreign policy (*World Orders Old and New*, New York, Columbia UP, 1994) or media studies (*Necessary Illusions*, Boston South End, 1989, and, with Edward S. Herman, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York, Pantheon, 1988). His views on clarity and his belief in the "good society" make him an heir of the Enlightenment. Robert Barsky's biography: *Noam Chomsky: A Life of Dissent* (Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1997) is an excellent introduction to his work and political thinking. The following interview deals only with the political aspect of his intellectual life.*



*Before we talk about the American left, could you explain how you became politically involved, and say a few words about the relationship between your work in linguistics and your political activities? Or maybe your scientific choices or your preferences as a citizen?*

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Well, I became involved as a young child. I grew up in the Depression, and I was always politically involved, ever since childhood, with one thing and another. So the only question was what forms it took. When the ferment of the '60s was beginning, there was a range of opportunities for political involvement that had not existed in the 1950s, a very quiet and disappointing period.

*Were you quiet and disciplined yourself in the '50s?*

Not really, though opportunities were limited. I was in a military laboratory, the Research Laboratory of Electronics, and I was the first person, I suppose, who refused to get clearance, just as a protest. They didn't care much. Anything that was going on, any kind of activities or protests, I was often part of. But there was very little. In fact, I wasn't even sure I was going to stay in the country. I was thinking at the time of going to live in a Kibbutz in Israel. I had contacts there and had spent some time there, and I might well have left. I had no particular commitments to the academic world, so it was a period of flux anyway for me. Things got settled down here, we started having a family, and then the 1960s activities began, the Civil Rights movement, protest against the war, lots of other things. A range of options developed, which I did become involved in, but I was more or less picking up interests and activities from childhood.

*Do you find there's a relationship between what you do in linguistics and your political activities?*

I could just as well be an algebraic topologist. Of course there are some connections, though, if you look closely enough at this... If you go back to the Enlightenment, roughly around that period, there was a connection drawn between a kind of theory of freedom and theories of mind and language. You find it in Rousseau and Humboldt and others, in the early days of classical liberalism, and of more radical versions of Enlightenment thought, and it developed somewhat later. I think at some abstract level you can make certain connections of that type. But they go way beyond anything that's understood. We're talking about core factors of human nature which might lie at the origins of society and social struggle,

and might also lie at the origins of our cognitive nature, but now we're going well beyond what science could tell you. And those connections, if real, are pretty abstract. I don't draw them myself. If people ask me about them, I'll talk about them.

*Well actually I have a question about the left in academia as well. You mentioned the Enlightenment, and as you know, a lot of people, so-called postmodernists, dispute the idea that the Enlightenment was in fact a step towards progress. How do you position yourself in this debate?*

In the debate with the postmodernists I don't position myself at all, partly because about 90 per cent of what they're saying seems to me unintelligible, so I have no way of positioning myself with regard to it. And much of the other ten per cent seems to me either obvious or else false, so I don't position myself.

*In one of your books you talk about the "latest Paris lunacies." Do you have specific writers in mind? What is it you object to, style or content?*

It's the kind of style that eviscerates content. There's a sort of play, which I don't find amusing, and when I try to detect the content, it seems to me extremely scanty and uninteresting.

*Are you talking about people like Derrida, Baudrillard?*

Yes, and Lacan and Kristeva and others. I don't talk about them. The reason I don't talk about them is I don't know their work very well. The reason I don't know their work very well is that when I try to read it, I get very little out of it. First of all, it seems to me extremely over-inflated. I mean, anything that I can understand, it seems to me, could be put quite simply. When I get to the parts that are put quite simply they seem to me not very interesting. So for example, I don't have to be told that foundationalism is dead. That was known in the seventeenth century, and I'm not impressed when somebody rediscovers it and puts it in hugely inflated and pompous rhetoric when it was understood 300 years ago and they said it simply. It would be hard to find a foundationalist since the seventeenth century, including even the Vienna circle. So, critiques of foundationalism don't seem particularly interesting. To say that conceptions of truth are relative to our cultural background, and so on, I mean, I knew that when I was a child, and I don't have to be told it in a very elaborate and flowery prose with irrelevant references to show how literary you are and so on. These are just games of intellectuals, and I'm not interested.

*I have more questions about this, but I want to start asking questions about the left. Some people say the American left is dead. Do you think the reports of its death are greatly exaggerated, and in what way does the left in America differ from the European left?*

It's always been different. The countries are very different. The United States has always been very disorganized. It's never had left political parties to bring people together. The labor movement, while very active and lively, is not like the European labor movement. For example, in Paris you can have a general strike, in the United States you can't have a general strike. That's because the labor movement is scattered and segregated internally even by law. The United States is very much a business-run society, much more so than any other, and the legal system is designed so that class solidarity is inexpressible. So, actions like general strikes and secondary boycotts and so on are in fact illegal. But it shows up in the society in all kinds of ways, and the same is true of the left, the dissident—I don't use the term "left" much, I'm not sure what it means—but the critical or dissident popular movements, whether they're involved with the environment, women's rights, minority rights, aggression, human rights, economic oppression, or whatever, there's a whole range of them. I think they go far beyond anything in Europe, but they're very scattered and separated, so they're not organized. But they're certainly not dead, they're much more lively than they were in the '60s, much more lively.

*Why don't you use the word 'left' any more?*

I rarely used it before either. The terms of political discourse have been so corrupted by intellectuals that they're almost useless. For example, people talk about Marxism-Leninism as the left. In my view, Marxism-Leninism is on the extreme right. I don't feel like arguing about terminology so I just don't use the word. It was a system designed, pretty much as Lenin said, to destroy every socialist institution. That was its main purpose, he made it very clear, and to subordinate the mass of the population, to a vanguard leadership, which would drive them to some form of industrialization and modernization. In my view, that's the extreme right.

*So you would characterize yourself more as a dissident than a man of the left?*

I relate myself to the traditional libertarian left, but that's one tendency within what's called the left. There are other tendencies within the left that I consider far right. And certainly there are tendencies that are

considered right that I consider left. Take, say, classical liberalism. If you read Adam Smith, I'm not talking about the illusions that are concocted about him but the actual text, there are many things that I would consider typical left-wing thought. So for example, Adam Smith does give an argument for the market, but his argument for the market is based on the assumption that under conditions of perfect liberty, which he hopes will be attained, the market would lead to perfect equality. In fact he regarded equality of outcome, not equality of opportunity, as being an obvious desideratum for a decent society. That's a left-wing idea. Or Aristotle. Let's take Aristotle, the founder of modern political thought. Is he on the left or is he on the right? Aristotle discusses the different kinds of social order, oligarchy, tyranny and democracy. Among the three, he prefers democracy, but he also mentions flaws in democracy, and the flaws are interesting. The major flaws have to do with inequality. So, if you have a concentration of wealth within a democracy, then first, most of the population will not be able to participate freely, because they don't have the opportunities. And even if they were to participate, they would use their force, their numerical force, to pursue their own interests, not the common good of all, and their own interests would be opposed to the interests of the minority of the wealthy. Well, for him democracy ought to be free, participatory, a community of free men participating equally, trying to find the common good. So a democracy wracked by extreme inequality would have serious flaws. He saw a conflict between democracy, on the one hand, and inequality and poverty, on the other. His conclusion was: let's eliminate poverty. So, for Aristotle, democracy has to be what we would call a welfare state. It has to guarantee "lasting prosperity to the poor" by distribution of "public revenues," a welfare state in other words. And then he goes on to describe means of doing this. He says that the best, the only properly functioning democracy, will be when everybody has "moderate and sufficient property." Property is a broad term. Well, is he on the left or is he on the right? He's taking a position which in contemporary terms would be called left-wing social democracy. He doesn't talk much about organization of work, he's obviously not talking about the industrial system and so on and so forth, but in the spectrum, he'd be way off on the left. On the other hand, there are conflicting factors. By "community of free men," he meant first of all men not women, and secondly he meant not slaves, and thirdly not aliens, so that cuts out a considerable part of the species. It's a little hard to blame Aristotle for this; these questions were not addressed until very recent years in fact. Nevertheless, there is Aristotle.

Now let's take a look at the foundations of American democracy, the freest country in the world, I think, the place to look if you want to look at stable democratic institutions.

*You are a severe critic of the US but you also say it's the freest country in the world. For a lot of people in Europe it's an apparent contradiction, so can you...?*

It can be the freest country in the world and still have plenty of things wrong with it. The freedom is of a special kind. There can't be a capitalist society, it couldn't survive for five minutes, but countries do vary on the spectrum of more or less capitalist, and the US is towards the capitalist end of the spectrum. And the more you go towards a capitalist system the more everything becomes a commodity. In principle, commodities are available, and you can have as much as you can buy. Take shoes—in principle they are available, and you can have as many as you can buy. If you have no money you go without shoes; if you have a lot of money, you may have a thousand shoes. That's the capitalist system. The same principle extends to freedom. In principle there's a lot available, more than any other country that I know. On the other hand, you get as much as you can buy... I can buy a lot, but a poor person... You can walk down the street where people are begging for money so they can make it through the night; they can't buy much freedom. So in principle, it's available, maybe more so than anywhere. In practice it's not often available. It's not a contradiction. That's a description of the complexities of existence, and if people see that as a contradiction they're not thinking clearly. So, the United States is the freest country in the world in the sense that rights are guaranteed. The State, for example, has the most limited authority to coerce of any country I know, any major country at least, and that's freedom. Freedom of speech, the United States is one of the few countries where freedom of speech is even regarded as a value to be preserved. In France, the concept's not even understood, but in the United States, yes, it's understood. On the other hand, going back to your left/right story, let's go back to Aristotle and take a look at the founding of this country which, certainly in the 18th century was a major step forward in the development of human freedom. So, consider the American Constitution. If you look at the American constitutional debates, you discover that James Madison, who was the framer, faced exactly the same dilemma as Aristotle, almost in the same words. He said yes, we want a democracy, but if there's going to be inequality, the mass of poor people will use their voting power to attack the wealth of the rich. They will carry out what we would call agrarian reforms—it was an agrarian society—so they will try to take the property of the rich and have it for themselves. And he said that's wrong, just as Aristotle thought it was wrong. They faced the same dilemma but drew opposite conclusions. Aristotle's conclusion was, "Okay, let's eliminate poverty." Madison's was, "Let's eliminate democracy." Quite clearly, he said the goal of government must be "to protect the minority of the opulent against the majority."

*The “great beast”?*

The “great beast.” Hamilton’s “great beast.” We must “protect the minority of the opulent against the majority,” and we can do that by ensuring that power is in the hands of “the wealth of the nation,” the people who will be sympathetic to property. He foresaw that there would be a vast expansion of those who “labor under all the hardships of life and secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings.” These people have to be marginalized.

Well, who’s left and who’s right, Aristotle or Madison? I don’t find these terms useful. It seems to me what we should do is look at what they said. Madison was certainly more libertarian than Aristotle on many issues. On the other hand, on some fundamental issues, I would say that Aristotle is way to the left of Madison, and probably to the left of virtually anyone you can think of in the political spectrum today. These are very strange concepts; I don’t think they mean much. If by the left you mean people who are fighting for more justice, more freedom, and more rights, control by people of their own destinies and so on, okay then I can identify the left. But then a lot of people who are called libertarian are not on the left. For example in the United States and England—and now with US influence, the term is spreading around the world—there’s a concept of libertarianism that is completely opposed to the traditional concept. Traditionally the libertarian strand in political thought was left libertarian, socialist libertarian, in other words, anarchist. The United States was different. Here libertarian meant ultra-right, individualist anarchism. In my view that’s not libertarian, because what they’re saying is the State should have a very limited role, but private tyrannies can have a massive role. There are to be few constraints on private, unaccountable tyrannies. Corporations, which are close to totalitarian in their internal social structure, are supposed to have phenomenal rights... For example, they have the right of free speech, like advertising. It would horrify any classical liberal to say that a “collectivist legal institution”—to use the technical term of legal historians—an organic entity of the type favored in neo-Hegelian doctrine should have the rights of persons, say of speech as libertarians demand. So it seems to me that the difference between those that call themselves libertarians and the totalitarians is often rather slight. Again you have to look at the ideas and their meaning, not just give them labels.

*I have a question about Marxism. You said that you thought Leninists were rightists. Very often your critics accuse you of being a Marxist, although in your books this is not what you say, and there was a controversy, which I don’t know much about: Living Marxism and your alleged support for this Marxist perspective. Can you explain this perception?*

*Living Marxism* is a journal of the 1930s, when I was a child. It was the voice of people like Anton Pannekoek and Karl Korsch, Paul Mattick and

others who considered themselves Marxist, but were very anti-Bolshevik. The *Living Marxism* tendency, happens to be very close to anarcho-syndicalism for example. Daniel Guérin is one of the people who have written about that. I have too. I was interested in it and found a lot of good things in it. This was a kind of libertarian Marxism, rather close to anarchism. When people criticize it, I doubt if they know what they're talking about. They probably see the word "Marxism" and they think Stalinism. I'm not impressed with the level of discussion that goes on in France or...

*This is a controversy I heard about in the US...*

Have you ever heard of *Living Marxism*?

*Todd Gitlin told me about this... something about you being apparently in favor of the Serbs...*

When did I say that? Did you find it?

*I didn't...*

There's an awful lot of gossip that goes on among the academic left, and I have no particular interest in it, any more than in the gossip that goes on among the academic right. If you look, you may find that I have said something in favor of Serbs, like I think their human rights ought to be respected. For example, I don't think that Croatians ought to massacre Serbs. Okay, I just said something in favor of the Serbs. Now I'm sure that some fanatic commissar can take that and say that I'm in favor of Milosevic. That's the way it begins. But I'm not interested in that, so I don't involve myself with intellectuals because they're much too dishonest, and I don't want to have anything to do...

*I said that you're accused of being...*

But referring to my "support" for *Living Marxism* is very interesting. This is a journal the last issue of which, I think, appeared in 1939. It was a journal of the anti-Bolshevik left. And, yes, I did read it with interest when I was a teenager, a few years later. I also met Mattick and respected his work in general, and the work of serious people in the anti-Bolshevik left like Anton Pannekoek who wrote an important study of workers councils, among many other things, including very sharp criticism of Lenin. I also "supported" their support for the Spanish anarchists. Now, somebody can hear the word "Marxism" and start spinning associations and draw conclusions about the Gulag, but that's their problem, not mine. As to the

connection between *Living Marxism* and the Serbs—that is too absurd to discuss.

*Well, now I have a question about globalization. It seems to be a kind of buzzword. How do you see it affecting the Third World, Europe, and the US, and is it something that should be resisted in all its forms? And is it the equivalent of Americanization?*

Well, first of all, we have to be clear about what's happening. If we define globalization by such measures as let's say, the ratio of trade to the size of the economy, investment flows relative to the global economy, and so on, if we look at those measures, which are plausible measures of globalization, the story is that there was a very high level of globalization early in this century, under British domination, with the gold standard. In-between the two wars, it declined quite radically. Since the Second World War it's been picking up again, and it's now more or less like it was before World War I. So the level of globalization today, by general measures, is not unlike what it was before the First World War. But that's by general measures. If you look more closely, you find that the speed and the scale of financial flows has increased enormously in the last 25 years. This is largely a destructive part of the economy, it's not something that contributes to the economy, it harms the economy. If you're a speculator, you will move your money away from a currency where people are trying to stimulate the economy, because that might bring higher interest rates. And of course you'll flee from places with social support systems, health and education, which contribute to economic growth as well as human welfare. These are tendencies which drag down growth and they have exploded enormously since the early 1970s. I'll just give you some numbers... In 1970 about 10 per cent of international financial transactions were speculative, and about 90 per cent were related to the real economy, investment and trade. By 1990, those figures had reversed. By 1995 about 95 per cent was speculative, and furthermore the quantity just exploded. It's now over a trillion dollars a day, which just moves from one financial exchange to another... A lot of it is just speculating against currencies and things like that. And that's had an extremely harmful effect on the economy. It's exploded very fast, and it was not true in the early part of the century. So that's a new phenomenon, a very dangerous one, which is harming the economy considerably. It can be stopped. It's a decision to allow it to happen, but it's the decision that's been made, and a lot of people benefit from it. The top few per cent of the population, ranked by wealth, probably benefit from it enormously. Most people do not. In fact, they may be harmed... If you look at trade, trade relative to the size of the economy, trade is pretty much on the order of what it was early in the

century. However it's different in character. A good deal of what's called trade now is not trade. For example, probably half of US trade with Mexico is internal to a particular corporation. Take a company, say Ford Motor Company, who put together some parts in Indiana and then send them to Mexico where they've got super-cheap labor and no environmental constraints, and there they'll be assembled, and then they'll send them back to the United States to turn them into a car. Well, that's called exports to Mexico and imports to the United States. But Adam Smith wouldn't have called it trade. It's internal to a totalitarian institution; it's internal to a huge command economy, the Ford Motor Company. What goes on internal to Ford is not free trade, it's a command economy. And that's a big piece of trade, it's now estimated roughly about 40 per cent, for the major economic powers. These numbers are very indefinite, because we're dealing with totalitarian institutions. They don't tell you what they're doing, so it's very hard to get good data as to what's really happening. But the estimates of international economists are mostly in this range. O.K. now, that's not trade at all. That's internal operations of command economies.

*The neo-liberal argument as put forward by The Economist, for instance, is: Mexicans benefit. They have jobs. How do you...*

Sure, they benefit greatly. You can tell how they benefit. During the period of neo-liberalism for over ten years now, Mexican wages have dropped about 40% or 50%. And nutritional levels have collapsed. And millions of people have been driven off the farms. The standard of living has become far lower. But a sector of Mexicans have benefited. For example, the number of billionaires has gone way up. And that, from *The Economist's* point of view, is great. Economists have a concept of economic health, which is divorced from the health of the economy. Economic health has to do with macro-economic statistics. So, what's the inflation rate, what's the growth of the GDP, and so on and so forth. It has nothing to do with the health of the economy. By those standards, Mexico has been regarded as an "economic miracle." It was the same with Brazil. Brazil was regarded as an "economic miracle" until 1989. It had the far highest growth rate in Latin America, much higher than Chile. It was considered a great "success story of American capitalism." From the mid-1940s, it was described as a "testing area for scientific methods of development by the methods of American capitalism." It was "the Latin American darling of the business community," as the business press put it. And it was just marvelous for about 10% of the population. So, about 10% of the population was like Paris, and London, and New York. And the other 90% ranged from suffering to total misery. If you look at the ranking of Brazil by the UN human development statistics, it ranked next to Albania.

But it was an economic miracle by the measures that count. For rich people. These are highly ideological disciplines, and highly ideological numbers. The system impacts on Mexicans in such a way as to lower their incomes radically, to drive them off the land, to lower their health, and so on. That's the way it interacts with Mexicans. Now the *maquilladoras*,<sup>1</sup> the foreign companies that have invested there, they have virtually no linkage to the Mexican economy. Their inputs come from here; their outputs return here. They do use very cheap labor and benefit from the brutality of the labor system, which prevents people from organizing, and the lack of environmental controls and so on, and you could say, look, like *The Economist* says, at least they have some jobs. Yeah, they have some jobs. On the other hand, if Mexico was organized differently, and not under the control of foreign investors, they could have quite different kinds of jobs, better ones...

*And about the American aspect of globalization. Do you see globalization as being a new form of American dominance, in the same way as in the past you had British globalization, or semi-globalization?*

In every period of modern history there has been some level of globalization. In the early part of this century, it was high and then it went down. Now it's going up. Whatever it is, it's to the benefit of the more powerful. That's almost a trivium. In the early part of the century, Britain was a hegemonic power. It had a very substantial role in the world, a leading role in fact. Britain was called liberal, so it was supposed to believe in free trade. That was mostly fraud. For example, something like 40% of their exports went to the colonies. By the 1920s, Britain realized that it could no longer compete with the Japanese, who had the highest growth rate from about 1870 up till the 1990s. Japan was liberal, by some measures. It had plenty of state subsidy and support. But it had a kind of liberal trading system. Well, they were just undercutting British manufacturers. They were cheaper and better. And the British reacted exactly as expected. They closed off the Empire. So in 1932, Britain had closed off the Empire, which it controlled, to Japanese exports. That's part of the background for the Pacific War. That's British liberalism. The United States is the same. Britain turned to liberalism in 1846, after a hundred and fifty years of very high protectionism, violence, development of a powerful state. They had wiped out Indian industry. They were now in the process of

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1. *Maquilladoras* are factories set up alongside the U.S. border in Mexico. They provide U.S. companies with cheap parts or products manufactured by people who are paid very low wages and do not have health coverage or other benefits typical in a European Welfare state.

wiping out Chinese industry. They blocked Egyptian development. In fact, the only parts of the world that developed were those out of European control: the United States and Japan. But by then Britain had about twice the per capita industrialization of any other country, as a result of these measures. So they figured a level playing field would be fine, and they moved to "free trade," but with extreme reservations: control of the Empire, protected markets, and so on. About a hundred years later, the same thing happened in the United States.

*The US is a much stronger power than Britain was in the 19th century.*

Sure, by the turn of the century, the United States had a bigger economy than Britain, France and Germany combined. It was a super-rich country. But it didn't become a major player in the world until the Second World War. In 1945, the United States was in a position to basically take over the world. And it of course moved to do so. And for the first time in its history it turned to a kind of liberal internationalism. The United States has always been a highly protectionist country. That's how it developed. It developed by blocking British textiles, blocking British steel, developing its own industry with state subsidies, a big internal market, so it developed the same way every other country developed, by protectionism, state power, violence, and so on. But by 1945, it looked as if it were just overwhelmingly more powerful than anyone else, so it called for a liberal international trading order. But of course it didn't believe in it. So, the United States relied very heavily on public subsidies. That's why you have computers and the Internet, and airplanes and biotechnology, and so on. It's all massively subsidized by the public, which is a radical violation of free trade. And the whole dynamic sector of the American economy is like this. There are variations over time. The Reaganites were extreme opponents of free trade. They were the most protectionist administration in post-war American history. They literally doubled protection on imports. They simply blocked the Japanese out of the US market in semi-conductors and electronics, computers, automobiles, steel and so on. They poured funds in under the pretext of military spending, which is the usual way you fund... You get the public to fund the rich. And as a result they reconstructed a dynamic American economy, by radical violation of free trade, the most extreme since the Second World War. Other countries are sort of similar. They all play more or less the same way. If you look at the current trade agreements, they're called free trade agreements, but that's a joke. They're a mixture of liberalization and protectionism, carefully geared to the interests of the powerful. So one crucial part of the so-called free trade agreement is what's called intellectual property rights.

*Can you be specific?*

Intellectual property rights are an attempt to impose on the third world—the developing, or non-developed countries—protectionist restrictions far more extreme than the rich countries ever accepted. The United States, Germany, and France and so on, never accepted patent rules even remotely like those that are now to be imposed on the rest of the world. These are not only process patents, but even product patents. France is perhaps the only country that even experimented with product patents. That's one of the things that killed the French chemical industry. It shifted it over to Switzerland, because it was so destructive. Let's make it concrete. Suppose Merck, the pharmaceutical company, develops some drug, and then some scientists in India, which has a big pharmaceutical industry, look at that drug and figure out a smarter way to make it. It used to be possible for them to do so, because it was only the process that was patented. The new rules say no, they can't do it, because they're making a product that is patented. So, the effect is to drive down growth, to cut down innovation, to make people poorer, to prevent the third world from gaining technology, and to ensure that the rich and powerful control even more. What's that got to do with free trade? I mean, David Ricardo wouldn't even have laughed. This is not free trade. This is sheer protectionism in the interests of quasi-totalitarian institutions, like multi-national corporations, which conduct what they call trade, but a lot of it is internal. It's a kind of corporate mercantilism, with very powerful states running it.

*But to go back to globalization...*

Going back to globalization. About three quarters of all of these interactions are within the triad, Europe, Japan and the United States. Where's the rest of the world? Also, these are three areas where there are at least, formally speaking, democratic controls. There aren't going to be military coups, which means these developments can be controlled by public decision. They are not "out of control." It's a decision. The business press is extremely frank. It talks about "capital's clear subjugation of labor" in the last twenty years, a "radical shift in the economic balance of power" into the hands of management. It's true, and it's not just management, but financial institutions that have a big rentier client base. Well, these are human institutions, which can be changed, and the left is interested in changing them. So, let's be quite concrete. There's a new investment agreement coming along; it's being rammed through in secret, more or less: the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) that's being worked on at the OECD and the World Trade Organization. It's an agreement designed to free and to provide enormous rights to investors at the expense

of citizens around the world. Now, it's being done more or less in secret, because if people knew what was going on, they would be horrified. Journalists certainly know about it, but I have yet to see a single report about it in the mainstream in the United States... At the World Trade Organization it's being blocked by India and Malaysia, and other countries who don't want to totally sell out to foreign corporations. But at the OECD, it will probably go through, mostly in secret, and then it'll be passed through "fast track" legislation,<sup>2</sup> so it is hoped. That's what lies behind much of the passionate support for "fast track." It is designed to deter the threat of democracy. Then people will be locked into a treaty which grants investors incredible rights.

You can get a sense of the rights that they're going to have by just looking at what they're doing right now. NAFTA has some of these rights, and they're being tested. The Ethyl corporation, which produces leaded gasoline, which is outlawed almost everywhere, also produces other additives for gasoline, which are outlawed in just about every country, including the United States, because they're carcinogenic. Canada didn't yet have a law outlawing them, and the Canadian Parliament just tried to pass laws outlawing these additives. The Ethyl corporation is suing Canada, under NAFTA, claiming that that's expropriation of property. In other words, if Canada wants to eliminate an additive that they claim is carcinogenic, and which incidentally is banned in the United States, the Ethyl corporation says, "Well, you're stealing our property, and that's expropriation, and therefore you'll have to pay damages, or else you can't do this, under NAFTA rules."

*Well, who decides this?*

Not the Canadian courts. No, this goes to an international arbitration board made up of businessmen, who operate in secret and aren't accountable, and they come down with a decision, whatever it will be. This is a small point, but the Multilateral Agreement on Investment is intended to open this up totally, so that if any country, or any local community say Boston, if Boston wants to have investment directed, targeted to poorer communities, or to, say, allow rights for women, or to meet environmental conditions, or almost anything you can imagine, a foreign corporation can

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2. "Fast track" is a way for American presidents to bypass Congress when negotiating trade deals. When Congress passes so-called "fast track legislation," as it did between 1974 and 1996, trade deals are not discussed in detail. President Clinton who wanted to get "fast track legislation" passed in November 1997 had to contend with determined opposition on the part of many democrats and the labor movement among others. Clinton decided not to press for a vote when it became clear that it would mean defeat.

come in and sue the city of Boston under this new treaty and say you're not allowed to do that. On the other hand, the new treaty does not permit citizens or a government to sue corporations. It's completely one-way. And it goes on and on like this. Well, this is a matter of extreme importance. The left is interested in trying to make it public; the mainstream wants to keep it silent and so far has succeeded, which is quite remarkable. You may be for this or against this, but that it's important is undoubted. It's moving right along, and I have yet to see one word about it outside the marginal press. It's a major event, a major issue in the OECD. But it's not the kind of thing you write about. Someday it'll appear on the business pages, and most of the population still won't understand what's going on, what's hitting them. So... is the left active? Sure, the left is very active. They're running conferences on these things, having meetings about them, distributing information, organizing. As I say, it's much more lively than it was in the 1960's. It's about all kinds of issues, and it's made a lot of progress. But if you ask, does it have political parties or large-scale organizations, or journals, and so on, then the answers have to be mostly negative.

*Now let's move to the realm of culture. Do you think that the current type of globalization is different from the past one? You mentioned in the early part of the interview something about shifts in language, saying that the word "libertarian" has changed its meaning in the US. Do you feel that here's a kind of American hegemony that is strong in the field of culture?*

It's quite dramatic in Europe. I go to Europe occasionally. Europe is visibly losing cultural independence and adopting American doctrinal positions. People talk about music, and I'm sure that's true, but what interests me is another aspect, what I see among the intellectuals, where there has been a remarkable subordination to American ideology. European newspapers, to me look more and more like yesterday's *The New York Times*. For example, let's take the "peace process" in the Middle East—a process that is modeled on the homelands policy in South Africa.

But, this one is called the Peace Process. Well, it's very interesting to look at. I don't have time to go through the details here, but in fact we do find that from about 1970 to 1990, the United States stood alone in the world along with Israel in blocking any kind of negotiation or political settlement on the Arab-Israeli problem. The reason was that the US differed from the rest of the world on two issues. One, the rest of the world interpreted the basic document UN 242 as calling for Israeli withdrawal. The US had interpreted it that way, but in 1971 it switched to interpreting it to mean partial withdrawal as the U.S and Israel determined. The reason for that was that Egypt had accepted the US position, and put the US in the

dilemma of either having to accept Egypt and separate from Israel, or go along with Israel's refusal to withdraw. The second choice was taken. All right, from then until today, the United States has differed from the rest of the world in interpreting UN 242, the basic document, as not requiring full withdrawal. The second big difference is from the mid-seventies, when the international consensus shifted to recognition of Palestinian rights. The US was opposed to that. So it vetoed every resolution of the Security Council and voted alone with Israel year after year at the General Assembly. It blocked every other initiative from Europe and from the Third World, Palestinians, anyone. So, the US and Israel were alone in an extreme version of rejectionism: partial withdrawal only, no Palestinian rights. After the Gulf War, the United States was in a powerful enough position to institute its own super-rejectionist program, along the lines of the last twenty years. That's what's called the "peace process," and the rest of the world is accepting that as a peace process. I discover with interest when I go to places like India and Brazil, and of course Europe, that many people have forgotten what they believed five years ago.

*But is it the result of pressure on the part of the US?*

I think it's something much deeper. It's the result of deep subordination to US power. The process has become internalized in people's minds. The US calls it a peace process, therefore it's a peace process, even if it's in fact a Bantustan process, which we vigorously opposed for twenty years. They have the power, and we accept what they say. The left press in Europe calls it a peace process. Did they ever refer to South Africa's Bantustan program as a peace process?

*Well, there are papers like Le Monde diplomatique...*

*Le Monde diplomatique* is different. It is one of the very few examples which have not joined into this... There are other cases. The London *Guardian* hasn't totally succumbed. You can find scattered examples, but overwhelmingly, it's been accepted. As for *Le Monde diplomatique*, you're right, they have not assimilated themselves to the subordination to US ideology, which is very dramatic in Europe, and even more so in the Third World. And understandable. That's where wealth and power are, and intellectuals go where wealth and power are. After all, why were intellectuals drawn to Leninism? Leninism was a doctrine that said intellectuals have a right to rule the world. That's attractive to intellectuals. And as long as they thought that there was some hope of that intellectuals were drawn to Leninism. When they recognized there wasn't much hope of that, those very same intellectuals moved to the right, often the far right. I

don't even think many of them changed their beliefs and attitudes; they just changed their commitments.

*In a way, you anticipate my question. Since you talked about Israel, you know that some of your critics, whether from the left or from the right, call you a "self-hating Jew," or they criticize your belief in a two-State solution...*

First of all, I have never been enthusiastic about a two-State solution, so they can't criticize me for that.

*They claim that you have this fallacious idea that a two-State solution is possible...*

That's very interesting, because the two-State solution that I didn't advocate is exactly what was advocated by mainstream opinion in Europe for twenty years. Is that an exotic position? The position of every European government? I mean, you're talking to people who are so unconnected with the world, that they can't even... it's hard even to discuss things with them.

*But do you analyze this as the same kind of approach as saying, "He's a Marxist, he's a self-hating Jew, therefore we must..."*

What do you mean? Why am I self-hating? When I go to Israel, as I did a few months ago, if I'm a self-hating Jew, how come the press is full of favorable reports, very sympathetic interviews, long discussions... I have a file this thick of interviews... If I'm a self-hating Jew...

*You also say that the press is freer in Israel...*

It's not "freer," it's just not insane. I mean, what makes me a self-hating Jew? What is the evidence...? Look, suppose I say you are a child abuser? Do you have to answer that? Suppose I say, look, I spoke to somebody who told me you abuse children? Do you have to answer that question? It's beneath your dignity to answer the question.

*No, no the question is: Can you explain how this works, the strategy behind it?*

I think it's very easy to explain. If you're an intellectual, and you're at least smart enough to know that you can't answer somebody's arguments because you don't know the facts, and you can't follow the arguments, and you don't have the evidence, if you're at least that smart, what you do is

what a construction worker does in a 3rd Avenue bar in New York: you scream at him. Now, if you're in the 3rd Avenue bar, you use four-letter words. If you're an intellectual, you use bigger words. You use words like "Marxist," or "Living Marxism," or "conspiracy theory," or "self-hating Jew." These are the intellectual equivalents of four-letter words. You know you can't answer arguments, and you'd better keep away from the arena of serious discussion, so you just throw smut. It's very standard. Intellectuals do it just like everyone else. But they do it with bigger words.

*On the Arab-Israeli conflict, is there a left in the US? I mean, it seems that left voices—left in the sense of being in favor of progress, more justice, and so on—in the way you define it, after rejection...*

Here, again, again, there's a difficulty in responding. This is a country that is very heavily polled. Business wants its finger on the public pulse, so there's a huge amount of evidence about public attitudes. And they're interesting. So, for example, the American public over a long period has been about two to one in favor of a Palestinian state. Does that make them the American left? I mean, the US government happens to be totally opposed, but the population is about two to one in favor, and that's kind of interesting. Because, that's without anyone publicly advocating it—I mean, if people didn't publicly advocate it, it's because the intellectuals who reach an audience are the ones who keep very close to the official line, so they're in favor of what they call the Peace Process, not the international consensus of the past twenty years. Nevertheless, the population was about two to one in favor. So who's the left?

*Why don't the authorities pay the political price if...*

Because, although they're in favor, those two-thirds of the population don't care about it. It's one thing to have an opinion, and it's another thing to do something about it. Furthermore, they see no way of doing anything about it. Remember, about 80% of the population here regards the government as just a farce. About 80% of the population says that the government works for "the few and the special interests," not for "the people." That's why people don't even bother voting. This is a very free society, but it's also a very atomized society. People are separated from one another. It's a disintegrated society. People do not have political organizations. You don't get together to work out political ideas and programs. As I mentioned, even the labor movement, which has often been a force for democracy and change, is very scattered into fragments in part by law and violence, but in part for other reasons... The result is people have all kinds of attitudes, but they don't express themselves in political

action. The very narrow sectors of power and privilege can do what they like in a very free society. That's some of the complexity of human life.

*On immigration there seems to be a rift among left-wingers and liberals. On the one hand, labor unionists, fearing for their jobs and wages, oppose massive unrestricted immigration; on the other cultural leftists reject the idea of a "reserve army" of low paid workers and welcome the diversity brought by immigration and find themselves on the same side as the world of business. How do you analyze the situation?*

On attitudes towards immigration, it's understandable why people whose lives may be harmed by immigration would be opposed to it. CEOs would be opposed if there was a massive immigration of highly qualified replacements for them at lower salaries. The academic/professional worlds have generally reacted negatively when waves of immigration (fleeing Nazism, for example) threatened their positions of prestige and privilege. As for the academic left, I doubt that there is much of a consensus. There's a conflict of principles, and people try to resolve it in various ways. One thing is clear: if there were anyone who really believed in free trade and markets (it would be hard to find any), they would certainly favor freedom of movement of people, independently of borders.

*It seems that in the US it's far more fashionable, in the academy at least, but also in the press, to talk about race, possibly gender, but not to talk about class, except in terms of "classism," which is not really talking about class.*

Well, "class" is a four-letter word in the United States, a dangerous word. This, as I say, is a business-run society, and everything is set up in such a way that you shall not see a fundamental or social conflict over power. There is one sector of the population which does talk about class all the time: the business world. If you read the business press, it's full of talk about class. In fact, they regard themselves, quite consciously, as being engaged in bitter class warfare. And in the business press you find discussion about "the rising political power of the masses" and how we have to keep them down and "fight the everlasting battle for the minds of men" and ensure that the lower classes are subordinated. This is all over the business press. But outside the vulgar Marxist sectors of the business press, it is considered impolite to talk about these matters. In fact, the United States is one of the very few countries where the census reports, which are very detailed, don't include information about class. The United States is one of the very few countries that do not estimate social indicators. There's a ton of statistics about people, but it's very hard to find

social indicators because they don't gather them. There's a medical researcher at Johns Hopkins University who wanted—it's well known that there are big differences in health between blacks and whites, so they're race differences—who was interested in asking how much of this was a class difference and how much was a race difference, because of course there's a race/class correlation. Well, he had a hard time first of all, because the US doesn't give data on class like in other countries. But when he used complicated measures to try to sort out these two factors, he submitted his article to the leading American journals, and they turned it down. He finally published the article in the *Lancet*, which is the British medical journal, the world's most famous medical journal. There, they could conceive of an article on class and health. Here, it's excluded from the domain of polite discourse, except in the business press, where it's all over...

*You call them "vulgar Marxists"... Is it the reason why you seem to prefer The Wall Street Journal to the newspaper of record, The New York Times?*

I mean vulgar Marxists in the sense that they accept a kind of vulgar version of Marxist doctrine and shift all the values...

*Do you feel you learn more by reading The Wall Street Journal than by reading The New York Times?*

No. Actually, the reporting in *The Wall Street Journal* happens to be of a quite high quality. Typically. For all sorts of reasons, partly because they trust their audience, I guess. The editorial pages are just a comic strip, but the reporting is extremely good, and in fact often very critical of business practices. They can sort of get away with it. Same is true for *Business Week*. For example, the Reagan administration, which was a criminal state, I mean not only its international behavior, which was war crimes all over the place, but even internally, the Reagan administration essentially informed the American business community that they were not going to enforce the laws on labor organization, here are all kinds of laws on illegal labor practices, on health and safety standards and so on, and the Reagan administration made it clear to the business community that they were not going to enforce the laws. So the number of workers illegally fired for trying to organize went way up, and the number of injuries went way up, and so on. And the only place I saw this reported on honestly was in *Business Week*.

*Can one say that full objectivity is impossible in the media today, that objectivity is an old-fashioned idea?*

The statement that “full objectivity is impossible” is hardly a matter of contention, if it is understood to mean that we cannot be other than the creatures that we are. The fact that experience is in part a construction of our modes of cognition was understood in the 17th century, not to speak of our richer interpretations of experience within explanatory theories; all of this reached the level of “conventional wisdom” not long after. The standard modern outlook is, I think, pretty much as described by historian of philosophy Richard Popkin, discussing the anti-foundationalism of the 17th century reaction to the Cartesian skeptical crisis: “the recognition that absolutely certain grounds could not be given for our knowledge, and yet that we possess standards for evaluating the reliability and applicability of what we have found out about the world,” thus “accepting and increasing the knowledge itself” while recognizing that “the secrets of nature, of things-in-themselves, are forever hidden from us.” The sciences take this for granted, as do other branches of rational inquiry. The fact that we are part of the natural world and cannot escape our own minds does not in the least entail that we should abandon the effort to try to gain the clearest understanding of the world we can, and to subject our beliefs, conceptual apparatus, and conclusions to the harshest tests we can devise. This seems close to truism. On recent versions of these matters, one can raise various questions, perhaps worth inquiry, but that is a different matter.

*I'd like to end with what you said about people not being able to understand the concept of free speech in France...*

France is the only country I know where the courts have held that the State has the right to determine historical truth, and to punish deviation from it. France is the only country I know where there is a law that says that it's a crime to question the conclusions of International Tribunals.

*Are you trying...*

Well, there is the case of the law that was applied against Bernard Lewis. He is an American, a well-known American scholar, who happens to be pretty supportive of Turkey, and apparently he made some remark in France—I don't know exactly what he said—about the Armenian genocide. He was brought to court, and tried, and punished, because—maybe—let's say he was supporting genocide, I don't care what he's saying—he didn't follow what the French state has determined to be the truth. So therefore he's punished. And that caused a furore here, because here, there's a

concept of freedom of speech. Incidentally, when France does exactly the same thing with Holocaust revisionists, it doesn't cause any furore here. Because here, though they accept the concept of free speech, it's very sharply honed. You do it to Bernard Lewis, who's a professor at Princeton, and a respectable guy, and can't get away with it. You do it to somebody whom everyone hates, and you do get away with it. But it's the same law. And France is one of the very few countries...

*I think they have strict laws in Germany too, the idea being that you have to restrict racist speech.*

It's hard to accept that claim. For example, in the United States, there are prominent and respected intellectuals who describe the Holocaust as an "exploded fiction," right in the mainstream, referring to the Nazi slaughter of the Gypsies and rejecting the contention that the Gypsies were treated like the Jews. Have any of them been subjected to freedom of speech restriction? Or even criticized? The Gypsies, who were treated just like Jews, are still persecuted in Europe so that Holocaust denials, in this case, including the kind of ridicule I just quoted, contributes directly to repression and terror. But does anyone get prosecuted for their "negationism" about the crimes against Gypsies? No. There are no laws against hate speech. There are laws against people you hate. That's something quite different.



# *The Selling of Academe: American Universities in Service to Business<sup>1</sup>*

by Lawrence Soley  
Marquette University

There has been a “virtual explosion over the past several years in the number and variety of university-industry alliances,” concludes the National Academy of Science. The “relationship between academe and business is more cordial than it has been for decades,” agreed the *Chronicle of Higher Education*. “[...] The sectors are increasingly resembling each other.”<sup>2</sup> Thus quietly, while the right wing blows smoke, denouncing universities for harboring radicals, and the media hold up mirrors reflecting fanciful images of left-wing domination, a major change in the role of higher education is taking place: large corporations, conservative foundations and well-heeled executives are buying the ivory tower and transforming it into an annex for industry. Across the country, well-funded defense contractors are seducing physics and electrical engineering departments; pharmaceutical and biotech firms are wooing molecular biology, biochemistry and medicine departments; and IBM and a few high-tech chip-makers are bedding down with university computer science departments. Increasingly, industry is creating endowed professorships, funding think tanks and research centers, sponsoring grants, contracting for research, and influencing who is hired as faculty and consultants. Under this cozy arrangement, students, faculty and universities serve the interests of corporations, not the public, as they sell off academic freedom and intellectual independence.

The auctioning of academe to the highest bidder extends from the Midwestern college that adopts a corporate logo for its sports team to the selling off of major research programs at top universities. At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), for example, a number of elaborate programs serve corporate interests. One of these is MIT's Industrial Liaison Program (ILP), which charges 300 corporations from \$10,000 to \$50,000 per year in membership fees. Like campaign contributions, the fees buy corporations "access"—in this case to research reports by MIT faculty, to 70 symposia and faculty seminars, and to personal attention from MIT academics. As the ILP catalog describes it, MIT places "at the disposal of industry the expertise and resources of all the schools, departments and laboratories of MIT."<sup>3</sup>

Professors are encouraged to participate in the ILP by an inducement program patterned after the coupons on the top of Betty Crocker cake mixes. They can redeem "points" they accumulate by involvement with member corporations for travel to professional conferences, computer equipment, office furniture, or other prizes. MIT awards each faculty member one point for each unpublished article that is made available to an ILP member, two points for a phone conversation or a brief campus meeting with a corporate member, 12 points for a visit to a company's headquarters or lab, and so forth. Each point is worth about \$35 in prize money.<sup>4</sup>

Another program that ties MIT to industry is the New Products Program (NPP), a joint project of the mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, and management departments. Under it, corporations pay the university \$500,000 to develop a new product within two years. Three faculty members and four graduate students are assigned to work on the product, and the students wind up devoting more than half of their time to it. In effect, students pay big bucks to participate in an internship.<sup>5</sup>

Program Director Woodie Flowers said he is "90 percent sure" that MIT will shut down NPP by September and open a new program under the School of Engineering. The National Science Foundation, Ford, ITT, Xerox, GM, and Polaroid have already committed \$30 million to be spread out over an 11-year period.<sup>6</sup>

Similarly, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute operated the Center for Product Innovation which conducted research for corporate clients. Its supporters including Timex, General Dynamics, and Norelco underwrote the center and funded specific projects. One of the center's most widely heralded projects was redesigning a coffeepot for Norelco. The University of Texas' Center for Technology Venturing also works on projects for corporate clients such as 3M, Ford, and Dell Computer Corp.

## **Pouring Rights & Wrongs**

The University of Minnesota (U of M) described by former National Endowment for the Humanities head Lynne Cheney as a bastion of political correctness<sup>7</sup> typifies the extent of the alliance between industry and academia. In 1996, for example, U of M signed an exclusive agreement with Coca-Cola, giving the soft drink exclusive “pouring rights” on campus and making it the official sponsor of on-campus promotional events, such as the “Diet Coke Volleyball Classic.” Its College of Liberal Arts houses the Personnel Decisions, Inc. Professorship of Organizational and Counseling Psychology, funded by a firm that develops psychological tests given to prospective employees; the Mithun Land Grant Chair of Advertising, named for an owner of the Twin Cities’ largest advertising agency; and the Elmer Andersen Chair in Corporate Responsibility, named for a former Minnesota governor and CEO of the H.B. Fuller Co., a paint and adhesives manufacturer that exports products banned in the United States, including the toxic glue sniffed by street children in Third World countries.<sup>8</sup> U of M’s business school is named for the owner of the Carlson Travel Network, the university’s preferred travel agency; and professors in the medical school have used their laboratories to conduct research for firms such as Curative Technologies and Endotronics, in which they had financial interests. Within the School of Journalism is a research center called the China Times Center for Media and Social Studies, funded by a Taiwanese newspaper magnate and political leader that “seeks humbly to promote” democracy in China, Taiwan’s *bête noire*.<sup>9</sup> The university “needs to make no apology for affiliating with private industry. This is part of our mission; always has been,” says retiring U of M President Nils Hasselmo.<sup>10</sup>

## **CEOs and Their Boards**

Hasselmo’s attitude is similar to that of other university presidents, who increasingly come from corporate board rooms, foundation suites, and smoke-filled back rooms. Michigan State University’s president is Peter McPherson, a former Bank of America executive who worked in the Ford and Reagan administrations. The new chief of the University of Massachusetts is former state senate leader William F. Bolger, and the new head of Wesleyan College is former Agency for International Development and National Public Radio chief Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.

One reason why university boards of trustees prefer presidents like McPherson and Bolger is that these individuals promote university-industry ties. As the head of Michigan State University’s industrial relations office observed, the institution is now “trying to make an atmosphere where faculty members feel they can be more entrepreneurial. [...] I think that with

Peter McPherson [as] our president [this will happen], he's had a business background and he's encouraging this kind of thing."<sup>11</sup>

Adding to the happy atmosphere of collegiality, university presidents and chancellors often serve on the boards of directors of corporations that have close ties to the universities. University of Texas (UT) Chancellor William Cunningham sits on the boards of Jefferson-Pilot Corp., John Hancock Fund Management Co., and La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., which established UT's La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc. Centennial Professor of Business. And until several conflicts of interest concerning Cunningham were exposed, he was also paid \$40,000 annually as a board member of Freeport-McMoRan Corp., a New Orleans-based mining company accused of environmental pollution. After the chancellor's ties came under public fire, he resigned his board seat and cashed in his stock options, netting a \$650,422 profit.<sup>12</sup>

Some of the fruits of the Cunningham/Freeport relationship remain: for a contribution of less than one-twelfth the cost of the building's construction, UT named its molecular biology building after Freeport's CEO James Robert ("Jim Bob") Moffett and his wife. Freeport had also endowed a professorship in UT's geology department, held by a professor doing geological research for Freeport in Indonesia, where the company collaborates with Suharto's dictatorship.<sup>13</sup> Freeport's contract for this research allowed it to review any academic articles the professor wrote before they were submitted for publication.

Cunningham is one of many university administrators serving on corporate boards. City University of New York Chancellor Ann Reynolds sits on the boards of Abbott Laboratories, Owens-Corning, American Electric Power, Humana, Inc., and the Maytag Corp. Her \$150,000 annual salary as chancellor is approximately doubled by what she gets as a board member.<sup>14</sup>

President Stephen Trachtenberg of George Washington University is on the boards of Loctite Corp., MNC Financial, and the Security Trust Co.

Universities return the favor. The domination of university boards of trustees by captains of industry further explains why these boards appoint presidents and chancellors with pro-industry biases. New York University's board includes former CBS owner Laurence Tisch, Hartz Mountain chief Leonard Stern, Salomon Brothers brokerage firm founder William B. Salomon, and real estate magnate-turned-publisher Mortimer Zuckerman. The composition of boards at smaller colleges is similar. The board of trustees of the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, includes executives from Montgomery Ward & Co., Graco, Inc., 3M, Waldorf Corp., Opus Corp., and Honeywell.

## Paying for Secrets

Although universities often claim that corporate monies come without strings attached, this is often not the case. Contracts for research, such as the one between Freeport-McMoRan and the University of Texas, frequently include provisions giving corporations some control over the dissemination of research results. A study published in the *New England Journal of Medicine* reported that the majority of companies entering into biomedical research agreements with universities require that the findings be “kept confidential to protect [their] proprietary value beyond the time required to file a patent.”<sup>15</sup>

According to the National Cancer Institute’s Steven Rosenberg, this secrecy is impeding scientific research. He contends that “open discussion among scientists, even about the preliminary results of ongoing experiments [...] can play an important part in advancing research.” Instead of an early and fruitful exchange of ideas, the secrecy agreements have imposed “the ethical and operational rules of business” on scientific researchers.<sup>16</sup> Not all contracts contain language that merely restricts when research findings can be made public. Some contain paragraphs giving the corporate contractor the right to determine whether the results can ever be released. A British pharmaceutical corporation, the Boots Company, gave \$250,000 to the University of California San Francisco for research comparing its hypothyroid drug, Synthroid, with lower-cost alternatives. Instead of demonstrating Synthroid’s superiority as Boots had hoped, the study found that the drugs were bioequivalents. Professor Betty Dong, who conducted the study, submitted her findings to the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, which subjected it to rigorous blind-review. The information could have saved consumers \$356 million if they had switched to a cheaper alternative, but would have undermined Synthroid’s domination of the \$600 million synthetic hormone market.<sup>17</sup>

When Boots found out about the scheduled article, it stopped publication, citing provisions in the research contract that results “were not to be published or otherwise released without [Boots’] written consent.” After Boots announced that the research was badly flawed, Dong was unable to counter the claim because she could not release the study.

## If the Shoe Fits

Even contracts that appear benign can have strings that choke academic freedom. In 1996, the University of Wisconsin signed a multimillion-dollar contract with Reebok, granting the running shoe manufacturer exclusive rights to make and market athletic apparel bearing the Wisconsin logo. In addition to paying coaches for promotional appearances for Reebok, giving financial support for the university’s

CORPORATE EASY CHAIRS

Ronald Reagan Chair of Broadcasting, Alabama

Lego Professor of Learning Research, MIT

Dow Chemical Co. Research Professor of Chemistry,  
Northwestern

Sears Roebuck Professor of Economics, Chicago

Nissan Professor of Economics, Chicago

Federal Express Chair of Excellence in Information  
Technology, Memphis

Fuyo Bank Professor of Japanese Law, Columbia

Hanes Corp. Foundation Professorship, Duke

Bell South Prof. of Education through Telecommunication,  
So. Carolina

Coca-Cola Professor of Marketing, Georgia

Krupp Foundation Professor of European Studies, Harvard

McLamore/Burger King Chair in American Enterprise, Miami

Reliance Corp. Prof. of Free Enterprise and Management,  
Pennsylvania

Foley's Federated Professor in Retailing, Texas

United Parcel Service Foundation Professor of Logistics,  
Stanford

Republic Bank Professor of Finance, Texas A&M

Rockwell International Chair of Engineering, UCLA

athletic program, and providing student internships at Reebok's headquarters, the contract included an Orwellian clause: "The university will not issue any official statement that disparages Reebok [... and] will promptly take all reasonable steps to address any remark by any university employee, including a coach, that disparages Reebok."<sup>18</sup>

Although university administrators publicly disclosed many other provisions of the Reebok contract, they kept the speech-restriction clause secret until the last moment. When it was finally disclosed as the contract was going before the board of trustees for approval dozens of UW professors signed a letter of opposition. Embarrassed by the flak and the exposure of their willingness to sell out the First Amendment and academic freedom, university administrators retreated, asking Reebok to cancel the speech-prohibition paragraph. Facing a public relations disaster, Reebok quickly agreed.<sup>19</sup>

Not content with buying specific research projects and athletic programs, corporations have put their stamp on academic departments by endowing chairs. The Carlson Travel, Tour and Hospitality Professorship at U of M, endowed by the owner of the Carlson Travel Network, provides money for the Carlson Chair for research on issues of interest to the travel industry. The executive vice president of the Minnesota Restaurant, Hotel and Resort Associations praised this research funding, saying, "We'll have data on who comes to Minnesota and why, why people fail to return, and other statistics that we need to make decisions about advertising, marketing and promotion."<sup>20</sup> Even when there are no visible strings, says University of New Mexico professor Gilbert Merckx, "there is always a natural inclination to be grateful to the donor."<sup>21</sup> Cal Bradford, a former fellow at the U of M's Humphrey Institute for Public Policy, says that outside funds "determine what universities will teach and research, what direction the university will take. [...] If universities would decide that they need an endowed chair in English, and then try to raise the money for it, it would be one thing. But that's not what happens. Corporate donors decide to fund chairs in areas where they want research done. Their decisions decide which topics universities explore and which aren't." After he criticized university ties to corporations, Bradford's contract at the Humphrey Institute wasn't renewed.

### **Ties that Blind**

Two changes in federal laws have helped cultivate the current relationship between universities and business: the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act (University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act P.L. 96-517), which was supplemented by a 1983 executive order extending the legislation to large corporations; and the 1981 Recovery Tax Act (P.L. 97-34). The 1980 law

and the executive order allowed universities to sell corporations patent rights derived from taxpayer-funded research. The result is a covert transfer of resources from the public to the private sector. The 1981 law made the arrangement even more lucrative for corporations by increasing the tax deductions they could claim for “donations” made to universities.

Corporations jumped at the opportunity. While federal tax dollars fund about \$7 billion worth of research, corporations for a relatively small investment can buy access to the results, at just a fraction of the actual cost. Given this direct subsidy in taxpayers’ dollars, plus the tax benefits, it is little wonder that corporate dollars going to universities almost tripled from \$235 million in 1980 to \$600 million in 1986. By 1991, the annual corporate investment had increased to \$1.2 billion, and by 1996 to around \$2 billion.<sup>22</sup>

The benefits to corporations from these investments is demonstrated by an agreement between Sandoz Pharmaceuticals and the Dana-Farber Institute, a Harvard University teaching hospital. Sandoz gave Dana-Farber a 10-year, \$100 million grant for research on cancer drugs. In return, Sandoz got the rights to any discoveries made by professors who had accepted Sandoz dollars, even if the actual discoveries weren’t funded by the Swiss pharmaceutical giant. Under this agreement, Sandoz was given the commercial rights for a method of identifying a mutant gene linked to colon cancer, even though the mutant gene research was primarily funded by the US government, that is, US taxpayers.<sup>23</sup>

This windfall of corporate welfare does not come without some work by the corporations. In May 1996, after several Republican budget cutters suggested that funding for scientific research be scaled back, university representatives and corporate CEOs met privately with House Speaker Newt Gingrich to lobby against cuts in biomedical research. After the meeting which included representatives from universities and executives from Biogen Corp., Bristol-Myers Squibb, Chiron Corp. and Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Gingrich endorsed a \$655 million increase in federal funding for the National Institutes of Health, \$175 million more than the agency had requested.<sup>24</sup> The success of the lobbying effort indicates the power and influence of the new university-industrial complex.

The biotech and pharmaceutical executives lobbied Gingrich because federal research funding represents a significant government subsidy for their industries, which receive the benefits of the work without paying for it. However, government grants are just one method involving universities for transferring resources from the public to the private, for-profit sector. Another transfer occurs when universities use federal and state tax dollars and tuition monies to build state-of-the-art research facilities. Corporations then use them and save the cost of building their own. When the low pay of graduate students who comprise the majority of research assistants is

added to the equation, universities can perform bargain-basement research tailored to corporate needs.

The high costs associated with conducting cutting edge research provide a plausible explanation for the soaring tuition fees of the last decade. Although universities have long claimed that grants and contracts for scientific research subsidize programs in the liberal arts and humanities, this is not the case, according to a financial analysis conducted by the Chicago Tribune. Using financial records obtained from the University of Rhode Island, the Tribune found that tuition dollars including those from students in the liberal arts and humanities subsidize scientific research.<sup>25</sup>

Although the university's president disputed the study's methods, he nevertheless conceded that around \$400 of each student's tuition may subsidize research.<sup>26</sup> While the subsidy is small, what corporations get from taxpayers through research grants and laboratory construction at universities points to a larger problem. What he didn't say is that this type of research has changed the purpose of universities, making them centers for corporate R&D rather than centers of instruction—servants of Mammon rather than of Minerva.

## Notes

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# ***The Ideological Uses of Japanese-Americans in U.S. Concentration Camps***

by Francis Feeley

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*Résultat d'un travail de recherche aussi considérable que novateur, l'article de Francis Feeley proposé ici – à partir d'un texte nettement plus long que l'auteur nous a autorisés à abréger – apporte de nombreuses informations, soulève des questions aussi graves que passionnantes, mais suscite aussi des réserves. Quelles que soient les précautions prises, la comparaison entre le sort réservé à quelque cent mille Japonais-Américains après le bombardement de Pearl Harbor et les camps de concentration nazis est difficilement acceptable. Francis Feeley met en valeur la « similarité fondamentale des logiques » sous-tendant « les idées nazies et la pensée américaine », parle de similar purpose... C'est un avis qu'il nous est impossible de partager : d'un côté, des méthodes (rassemblement de la quasi totalité d'une population d'origine étrangère considérée comme risque de guerre, confiscation de leurs biens...), des tentations (exploitation économique et militaire) et des pratiques (programmes de recherche) moralement condamnables ; de l'autre l'extermination programmée de plusieurs millions d'êtres humains. Ce n'est pas la même chose : entre la brutalité et l'injustice des mesures prises par un État en guerre (et qui n'était pas l'agresseur) et les atrocités sans précédent de la solution finale, les différences ne sont pas de degré, mais de nature. La démarche de Francis Feeley procède d'une vigilance louable mais exacerbée, et souffre peut-être d'une sorte d'hypertrophie du « devoir de mémoire ». Au lecteur de juger.*

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## Introduction

On the eve of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Census Bureau reported 125,000 persons of Japanese birth or ancestry living in the United States. The great majority of these people lived in communities on the West Coast.

On 19 February 1942, when President Roosevelt signed the infamous Executive Order 9066, he unleashed political forces which would lead to the forced removal and incarceration of all West Coast residents of Japanese descent. Initially the U.S. War Department imposed a curfew and encouraged Japanese-American families to migrate inland “voluntarily.” But the desperate flight of the first political refugees provoked such hostile response in the neighboring states that the “voluntary” phase of this program had to be canceled. By the end of April, the U.S. Army’s Western Defense Command, under the leadership of Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, had built fifteen military detention camps and was promptly filling them with civilians of Japanese descent.<sup>1</sup>

At the end of that summer, in August 1942, the U.S. Department of Interior took managerial control of this population after they had been deported in sealed trains with armed military escort to “concentration camps” sites, most of which were located in desolate regions, away from the West Coast. Here, in remote areas of the United States, the Japanese-American prisoners were assigned living quarters, surrounded by barbed wire and guarded by U.S. Army Military Police, for an indefinite period of time.

The War Department never really relinquished control over the prisoners in the ten “concentration camps.” Although they were administered by the U.S. Department of Interior for the duration of the war (with the exception of the Jerome camp in Arkansas, which was converted into a German POW camp in June 1944), the War Department had issued proclamations defining each War Relocation Authority camp as a “military area” over which it could exercise authority, and military personnel continued to maintain tight control over ingress and egress at these camps well after the administration and management of the camps had been turned over to the WRA. The War Department never really gave up control of the camps until March 20, 1946, when the last remaining prisoners were released, and the camp at Tule Lake in northern California, near the Oregon border, was formally dissolved, after the war was over.<sup>2</sup>

Mike Masaoka, the young national secretary and “field executive” of the Japanese-American Citizen League [JACL], which had collaborated with the forced removal policy, later claimed that the use of “concentration camps” was totally unexpected. He recounts that

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*We were never informed that they were going to be detention centers. We always had the impression that we would move to the assembly centers, then to the WRA centers and then be allowed to move out as we wished.*

Masaoka added, “perhaps in hindsight, we were a bit naive.”<sup>3</sup>

Masaoka estimated that the victims of this mass removal lost more than 400 million dollars in confiscated properties, including small family farms and businesses that were taken over by white residents in 1942. However, more recent estimates of Japanese-American losses have revised this figure upwards to between 2 and 6 billion dollars in losses. This money was never fully recovered.<sup>4</sup> However, on 10 August 1988, forty-five years after the fact, the U.S. Congress acknowledged that the civil rights of Japanese-Americans and U.S. residents of Japanese descent had been violated. By passing Public Law 100-383, known also as the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Congress (1) formally recognized the “fundamental injustice” of U.S. policy toward Japanese-Americans, (2) apologized “on behalf of the people of the United States,” and (3) agreed to make restitution to those individuals who had been forced into camps.<sup>5</sup> Two years later, in 1990, the U.S. government began making redress payments of \$20,000 to each survivor of these camps.

Redress payments have been made to most of the camp survivors.<sup>6</sup> But the official memory of U.S. domestic policy of “concentration camps” has been reduced to the recognition of a technical mistake. Basic questions raised by the existence of these camps, concerning the legitimacy of state policy in creating “concentration camps” for a civilian population, or the implications of these camps in a democracy where ostensibly the majority rules, or the role of social scientists in capitalist society have been largely evaded. As we shall see at the end of this article, the use of “concentration camps” in America remains a viable policy for the United States government and has been repeatedly contemplated by the executive branch and in closed sessions of Congress.

The aim, then, of this article is to provide a better understanding of the official policies that were adopted by the U.S. government to control its population in the 1940s, and to explain what role the national security state has played in the shaping of dominant social values in America. I will first describe anti-Japanese stereotypes that were circulating on the West Coast in this critical period of American history, and I will examine how people of Japanese descent were captured by an increasingly hostile environment.

When these civilians were finally forced from their homes and placed in federal camps, some government officials sought to avoid usage of the term “concentration camp” altogether, and euphemisms were invented in an effort to redefine government policy. In the second section of this article, I discuss this great evasion, which has not entirely disappeared from scholarly writings. I compare and contrast American “concentration

camps” with those of Nazi Germany, emphasizing major differences, but also stressing the important similarities regarding their origins and their initial purposes.

The second half of this article is devoted to discussing the many uses the federal government made of Japanese-Americans during the war. The third section is a brief discussion of the economic uses the U.S. Department of Interior tried to make of “concentration camp” prisoners, agricultural projects that ended in failure. A more successful use of the camp inmates is described in section four, where I analyze the subtle manipulations by the U.S. War Department. In the last section of this article, I describe how ambitious social scientists made use of these civilian prisoners and received research grants, War Department contracts, and federal employment in the new national security state by developing theories of assimilation and “modernization,” premised on the belief in “scientific neutrality.”

## **1. The Political Environment at the Time of the Second World War**

Recent research into the history of the *rapprochement* between the federal government and Japanese-Americans at the time of the Second World War has led to inquiries into the experiences of this minority population after they were captured and subjected to prolonged imprisonment in the name of “military necessity”.<sup>7</sup> By the summer of 1942, Americans of Japanese descent were caught in the unrelenting gears of an official axiomatic. The following premises were accepted as conventional truths by many American citizens.<sup>8</sup>

*Axiom #1:* The Japanese are clannish and do not try to become American.

*Axiom #2:* The Japanese cannot be trusted.

*Axiom #3:* The Japanese are willing to work too long, too hard, under inferior working conditions for a substandard living.

*Axiom #4:* The Japanese are grasping and ambitious, and there is a danger they will squeeze the Caucasian farmer and merchant out of business.

*Axiom #5:* The Japanese indoctrinate their children to be Japanese first and American second.

*Axiom #6:* The individuals and organizations that defend the Japanese are the same people who encourage conscientious objectors, miscegenation, and other undesirable practices.

*Axiom #7:* Japanese are not safe on the West Coast, and violence against them could have a bad effect on Americans in Japan.

With such a saturation of prejudice pointing to the supposedly “inherent” qualities of people of Japanese descent, the burden of disproving these

accusations was all but impossible. Taking on these axioms one at a time would have been self-defeating :

*Yoshiko Uchida described the devastating effect this axiomatic tended to have on the Japanese community. Society caused us to feel ashamed of something that should have made us feel proud. Instead of directing anger at the society that excluded and diminished us, such was the climate of the times and so low our self-esteem that many of us Nisei [see note 9] tried to reject our own Japaneseness and the Japanese ways of our parents. We were sometimes ashamed of the Issei [see note 9] in their shabby clothes, their rundown trucks and cars, their skin darkened from years of laboring in sun-parched fields, their inability to speak English, their habits, and the food they ate.<sup>9</sup>*

At the same time, the axiomatic generated many paradoxes from which their victims could not logically escape. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Nisei were encouraged to prove they were “American first” by spying on their Issei elders and on Kibei, born in the U.S. but educated in Japan, and reporting any suspicious behavior to the FBI. “Suspicious” behavior abounded, and, of course, such untrustworthy practices as spying on your own family and friends only confirmed axiom number 2. Likewise, the Issei were invited to prove their loyalty by obeying martial law and volunteering to work in sugar beet fields at substandard wages while consigned to segregated camp life, thus confirming axiom numbers 1 and 3.

Another paradox which succeeded in capturing over 110,000 West Coast residents of Japanese ancestry was formulated by California gubernatorial candidate Earl Warren. Just a few weeks after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the then Attorney General Warren told a meeting of California law enforcement officers that the fact no mainland Japanese had engaged in sabotage was sure proof that they were conspiring together to sabotage at a later moment.<sup>10</sup> In early 1942, another version of the same paradox was formulated by California Governor Culbert Olson, who chaired the Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play. He told a meeting of Japanese-American editors:

*You know, when I look out at a group of Americans of German or Italian descent, I can tell whether they are loyal or not. I can tell how they think — but it is impossible for me to do this with the inscrutable orientals, and particularly the Japanese. Therefore, I want all of you present here to pledge yourselves to make a sacrifice for your country, the U.S. of A. Promise to give up your freedom, if necessary, in order to prove your loyalty.<sup>11</sup>*

Premised on this “logical” request, the Fair Play Committee steadfastly refused to initiate a letter-writing campaign against forced removal.<sup>12</sup>

Paradoxes such as these left their subjects with no strategy with which to liberate themselves from such pervasive prejudices.

It was self-evident that certain traits were an inherent part of the Japanese character structure. Who could go against the conventional wisdom of the day? In early 1943, when “concentration camp” prisoners were given the opportunity to sign loyalty oaths to the United States of America, thereby disclaiming any loyalty to Japan, the Issei found themselves in the contradictory position of disclaiming their Japanese citizenship to satisfy the demands of a government that had refused them citizenship and that was now depriving them of their civil liberties. Many Issei refused to become persons without citizenship, and clung to the hope that their Japanese nationality would entitle them to some protection according to the statutes of international law. They were confronted with axioms number 5 and 6: the incorrigible enemy.

Official acceptance of the axiomatic had been resoundingly successful in silencing opposition to the forced removal. Eleanor Roosevelt, as director of the Office of the Civilian Defense Welfare Division, was also captive to this mode of thought. On December 4, 1942, while thousands of Japanese-Americans lived a life of considerable discomfort under continual surveillance behind barbed wire, she blithely reported to a *New York Times* journalist:

*I see absolutely no reason why anyone who has had a good record—that is, who has no criminal nor anti-American record—should have any anxiety about his position. This is equally applicable to the Japanese who cannot become citizens but have lived here for 30 or 40 years and to those new-comers who have not yet had time to become citizens.<sup>13</sup>*

This amazing insensitivity can be explained by her uncritical acceptance of the official axiomatic. For those whose lives were above suspicion the meaning of words like “a good record,” “criminal,” and “anti-American” seemed self-evident. While for Americans of Japanese descent, living under the weight of prejudice and discrimination, their physical appearance was an “indictment” and the natural resentment many of them felt at being mistreated was viewed as “unpatriotic”.

## **2. Concentration Camps Reconsidered**

The use of the term “concentration camps” in U.S. history has been contested by scholars and policy makers—both past and present. As early as March 1942, before the plan of mass removal was implemented, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy had objected to the term “concentration camps” to describe the U.S. camps that were built to incarcerate Japanese-Americans. He warned at the outset that the term should be avoided, arguing it was too provocative.<sup>14</sup> More recently, over forty years later, in February 1983, the U.S. Commission on Wartime

Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) issued a 500 page report, *Personal Justice Denied*, in which it agreed with McCloy, that the term “concentration camp” was inappropriate for this episode in American history. The commission wrote that “to use the phrase ‘concentration camps’ summons up images and ideas which are inaccurate and unfair...” Concentration camps, it argued, were synonymous with “death camps” and therefore the term should not be applied to the American camps.<sup>15</sup>

Certainly, the tragic outcome of Nazi “concentration camps” is in no way comparable to American “concentration camps” during the Second World War; yet the dreadful use of “concentration camps” as an extension of state policy shares a common history and a contemporary appeal that needs to be examined. American historian Roger Daniels has pointed out that United States government officials themselves repeatedly employed the term “concentration camp,” in the 1940s, in reference to the forced incarceration of people of Japanese descent living on the West Coast. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, himself, used the term, and numerous other government representatives found it a fitting description of what was going on. Michi Weglyn is among those historians, today, who have insisted on keeping the original term. In her book, *Years of Infamy* (1976), Weglyn argues that the euphemisms some government officials adopted were conceived to hide the grim reality of subjugation and make it more palatable to the American public. Use of the term “evacuation” instead of forced removal conjured up images of emergency assistance, such as victims of natural catastrophes might expect from a government bureau, like the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Likewise the label “internees,” instead of prisoners, allowed the government to minimize the coercive nature of the arrests and incarcerations. Over half those people forced from their homes were American-born citizens, children of Japanese immigrants, for whom government officials invented the convoluted term “non-alien.” Military detention camps were called “assembly centers,” bringing to the American mind images of voluntary social gatherings, such as high school assemblies where children are encouraged to participate in performances. Likewise, the term “relocation centers” would connote an innocent gathering of people in transit to a new home.<sup>16</sup> Such was the Orwellian language invented by U.S. government officials to hide the violence of a policy that deprived more than 110,000 persons of Japanese descent of their civil liberties for no other reason than their national origins. In the introduction of the 1993 edition of the book, *The Kikuchi Diary*, historian John Modell agrees that today these government euphemisms are “an embarrassment”. The term concentration camp, he writes, is more accurate than those terms that were coined to mask the policy of depriving this group of its civil liberties.<sup>17</sup>

While I agree with my erstwhile colleagues, Roger Daniels, Michi Weglyn, and John Modell, I would also argue that “linguistic accuracy” is not the only reason for preserving the original terminology; there is another, equally important reason which has to do with the role of historical study in modern society. The German Nazis, of course, did not invent the term “concentration camp” [*das Konzentrationslager*, or *KZ*]. The Spanish General Valeriano Weyler (also known as “The Butcher”) had used this tactic [*los campos de reconcentraci3n*] in an attempt to pacify the Cuban population before U.S. military invasion ended Spanish control of the Island in 1898. Also the British had employed this term in reference to the same strategy of incarcerating large numbers of civilians in limited camp areas during the Boer War (1899-1902), and, between 1915 and 1918, the Turkish state had used the concentration camp [*karakir*] during the Greco-Turkish War of 1921-22, if not in the genocidal policy they perpetrated against their Armenian population at the end of the First World War.

Despite these important historic precedents, I believe that accuracy is not the sole objective of history and that there is another equally important role for the historian today. “Memory,” wrote French historian Jacques Le Goff, “does not seek so much to preserve the past as to serve the present and the future.”<sup>18</sup> Franois B3darida, historian of the Nazi Holocaust, also argues that the purpose of history is more than accuracy; he warns against “memory for its own sake”. History, he writes, is not completely objective, and historical memory “must be a liberation and not an enslavement, which unfortunately we often see today.”<sup>19</sup> I believe that by denying the Japanese-American experience of “concentration camps,” and by collaborating with the attempt to redefine this experience, historians are abandoning the field of history to engage in propaganda, from which no lessons can be learned.

The Japanese residents in America had also suffered from a strictly legal discrimination, which created a special and emotional separation between those who made the laws and those who implemented them. Like the experience of German Jews, the bureaucratization of the Japanese removal process, in 1942, served to defuse responsibility and fragment the total perception of this crime. The anonymous victims were simply coerced to cooperate with unjust state policy, as they had done so often in the past. In both cases, there was little resistance.

Japanese immigrants had been denied U.S. citizenship from the time of their arrival in the United State, which dates from 1869. Only those born in the United States had the right of citizenship. By the early part of this century, state laws had been passed prohibiting intermarriages between Japanese-Americans and whites, and property laws, such as the California Alien Land Bill in 1911, were written to prevent Japanese aliens from owning land. In 1924, Congress passed an Immigration Act that disallowed

those aliens ineligible for U.S. citizenship from being admitted into the United States. This stopped all immigration from Japan. Like the Jews of Germany, the Japanese living in America had suffered a history of racial discrimination during many years prior to their removal into “concentration camps.” For most of those living on the West Coast, their lives had already been severely limited to a ghetto existence.

Political theories of biological determinism were not restricted to Germany in the 1930s and 40s. Long before mental patients and disabled people became the first victims of the Nazi gas chambers in euthanasia centers, more than thirty states in the United States of America had already passed eugenic sterilization laws. Before the First World War, these laws targeted people whom the state labeled as “criminals, idiots, imbeciles, epileptics, rapists, lunatics, drunkards, drug fiends, syphilitics, moral and sexual perverts, and ‘diseased and degenerate persons’.” It was widely accepted as fact that these “undesirable traits” were genetically inherited, and that they should be cleansed from society forever.<sup>20</sup>

The governing elite in the United States in the 1940s lent political respectability to racist ideas they had acquired from the “scientific” theories of their day. After the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, in December 1941, there were serious suggestions in the U.S. Congress that all people of Japanese ancestry (“the enemy race”) should be sterilized—both those incarcerated in the U.S. assembly centers, and, after the War, all survivors in Japan.<sup>21</sup> In 1945, President Roosevelt’s son Elliott Roosevelt told vice-president Henry A. Wallace that the U.S. should “keep on bombing until we have destroyed about half the Japanese civilian population.”<sup>22</sup> The President himself expressed an interest in compulsory eugenics, “a scheme to crossbreed the Japanese with docile Pacific islanders.”<sup>23</sup>

The Roosevelt family’s solutions to the “Japanese problem,” however, were never adopted; instead a more charitable program of indoctrination (called “Americanization”) was applied in the U.S. “concentration camps.” This “humane” alternative solution for dealing with the “enemy race” was suggested by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy in a letter to the civil libertarian and former president of Antioch College, Alexander Meiklejohn, dated 30 September 1942.

*We would be missing a very big opportunity if we failed to study the Japanese in these Camps at some length before they are dispersed [...]. These people, gathered as they now are in these communities, afford a means of sampling their opinion and studying their customs and habits in a way [that] we have never before had [...]. We could find out what they are thinking about and we might very well influence their thinking in the right direction before they are again distributed into communities.<sup>24</sup>*

McCloy's suggestion cannot be dismissed as the cavalier ruminations of an eccentric civil servant, as we shall see in the last section of this article.

In light of this information, I would argue on the basis of both *accuracy* and *utility* for the retention of the original term "concentration camps" in the discussion of Japanese-American history. Its preservation in the collective memory, I believe, is both justified and instructive because historically concentration camps have served as only one stage in a series of attempts to control specific populations, by stigmatizing them and rendering them helpless.

In recognizing this stage for what it is, one part of a desperate attempt by the state to forcefully exclude a potentially subversive population, the dire implications of the policy are more fully appreciated, and humanity is better prepared to resist incremental progressions toward total subjugation which have even led to genocide. Clearly there is a similarity in the basic logic (if you accept the premises) between Nazi ideas and American thought at the time. The Nazis thought: "Jews are conspiring against Germany. All Jews are biologically related. Therefore, all people of Jewish ancestry are the enemy of the state and must be eliminated." And American officials argued: "Japanese are exceptionally treacherous (after Pearl Harbor). All Japanese are biologically related. Therefore, all Japanese living on the West Coast of the American continents are enemies of the United States and must be placed in 'concentration camps.'" Hitler's definition of "Jewish" was those of at least 1/16th part Jewish ancestry (back to the fifth generation); the American government defined "Japanese" as at least 1/32nd part Japanese ancestry (back to the sixth generation).<sup>25</sup> Thus the perverse logic in both cases was in the following form: if  $x=a$  danger, and  $xy=x$ , then  $xy=a$  danger. It was a form of reasoning which condemned men, women and children, regardless of their condition of health, their age, or their social class origins, to "concentration camps" simply because of their biological being.

When placed in their specific historical contexts, the official uses of "concentration camps" can be understood more fully, as part of a strategy to terrorize the general population into docile compliance by humiliating and denuding the target population of any cultural resources that might develop into a capacity to resist injustices. It was only after years of suffering segregation and stigmatization that the systematic annihilation of these "undesirables" became possible. Jews were the first mass victims of this policy; then Slavs and Gypsies were to follow, according to the Nazi plan.

What is important to note here is the fact that the use of concentration camps in Nazi Germany preceded the creation of extermination camps by some six years. It was an ad hoc, piecemeal tactic that took on new significance as it developed. The concentration camp population was first

diminished and humiliated because they were perceived as dangers to the Nazi state; only then was the plan of systematic “extermination” put into effect.

In the case of the American practice, as in the initial stages of the Nazi program, there was an attempt to stigmatize all people of Japanese ancestry in order to facilitate a policy aimed at complete domination. A few weeks after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, when curfews were imposed on all West Coast residents of Japanese descent, many Japanese-American families lost their sources of income because they could no longer travel freely to and from work. In early March, they were encouraged to abandon their homes and relocate to another part of America. “Concentration camps” began to appear in mid-May, to contain a terrorized and often impoverished population. By early June, fifteen so-called “assembly centers” had been quickly constructed for more than 110,000 people of Japanese descent. These people had no idea what would happen to them, and at the end of the summer, when they were sent to “permanent relocation camps” in remote regions of the United States, they still had no idea of what their fate would be.

Even before this population was placed in “concentration camps,” American citizens and congressmen were calling for such dire actions as mandatory sterilization and “re-patriation,” for even U.S. citizens to be sent “back to Japan”. One proposal included using the camps for “reprisals” against American lives lost in Japanese camps. Another idea was to negotiate an exchange of prisoners of war with Japan, using the captured Japanese-American citizens and the more than 2,000 Latin Americans of Japanese ancestry who had been kidnapped by the U.S. government and placed to U.S. “concentration camps.” Still others developed the concept of turning the camps into forced labor communities, using the Japanese-Americans “to make the desert bloom.” These “enemies of the state”—men, women and children, some 70,000 of whom were American citizens—were completely helpless, caught up in a downward spiral of repressive state policy.<sup>26</sup>

The use of concentration camps in Germany, it has been argued, was irrational. How, in a period of labor shortage and when military defense was a dire necessity, could the Nazi state engage in a policy of mass arrests and incarceration that led ultimately to extermination? François Bédarida writes that there is no rational explanation why these prisoners were not put to work to support the German war economy.<sup>27</sup> Elsewhere, he quotes the author Primo Levi: “Perhaps what happened cannot be understood, and even *must not be understood*, in so far as to understand is almost to justify.”<sup>28</sup>

I do not agree with either of these statements. History, I believe, must inform “collective memory” with rational explanations, even if they

contradict the official memory of the state.<sup>29</sup> The significance of German concentration camps is that the Nazi state succeeded in elevating feelings of anti-Semitism, anti-Communism, and hatred of Slavs to the stature of national principle. These strong passions, cultivated by the state, served to mobilize the German population, through terror and the sheer force of example, in support of Nazi propaganda, such as “the master race” and “world conquest,” the meanings of which would have been exceedingly abstract in the absence of Nazi domestic policy. In other words, the terror of anti-Semitism did serve a rational purpose in pursuit of an irrational goal, and this, I believe, is an essential lesson from Nazi concentration camp history.

The U. S. “concentration camp” policy ended differently: unlike the Nazi camps, it did not lead to the attempted physical annihilation of a minority, but the *initial function* of the U.S. camps shared similar objectives, i.e. to organize support of the masses behind an aggressive military policy. In both cases, the general population was successfully mobilized around the fear and hatred of a specific domestic group. Once this group was stigmatized, as being “sub-human” and a liability to society, they were easily removed from society and placed in camps without mass protests. Restricted to these camps, their productivity decreased, but their utility as “scapegoats” served to mobilize the rest of the population around ideals of patriotism and self-sacrifice. In America the irrational abuse of Japanese-Americans was quickly brought under the control of the executive branch of government, specifically the War Department, the Department of Interior, and to some degree the Department of Agriculture.

### **3. Economic Uses**

As early as February 25, 1942, Thomas D. Campbell, a top expert in the Department of Agriculture, had written a letter to Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy encouraging mass evacuation and the use of West Coast Japanese for their “farming wizardry.” The Japanese-Americans, he argued, should not be allowed to live “near any factory, dock, warehouse, public utility, railroad, bridge, or reservoir.” He recommended to the Assistant Secretary of War that the Japanese-Americans be used as “seasonal migratory harvesters in sugar beats, cotton, and perishable crops.” The West Coast evacuees could live in re-opened Civilian Conservation Camps and the government could provide trailers for them to live in when at work. Campbell, also, advocated using the displaced Japanese to develop Native-American lands such as the area around Poston, Arizona.<sup>30</sup>

On 18 March 1942, President Roosevelt created the War Relocation Authority (WRA) and appointed Milton Eisenhower, a minor official in the

Department of Agriculture, as its director. Earlier that year, Vice President Henry Wallace had recommended at a cabinet meeting that President Roosevelt appoint John Collier director of the War Relocation Authority, in charge of the Japanese-American internment, "because of his expertise in community living."<sup>31</sup> Collier was Roosevelt's Commissioner of Indian Affairs. When Roosevelt appointed Milton Eisenhower instead of Collier, Collier was placed in charge of 20,000 Japanese-American inmates incarcerated at the Colorado River Indian reservation near Poston, Arizona. Eventually Collier had a falling out with Eisenhower's successor Dillon Myer, who became director of WRA on 17 June 1942. Myer envisioned the eventual dispersal of all Japanese-American prisoners throughout America to prevent their return to the "Little Tokyos" on the West Coast.<sup>32</sup>

Collier had his own plans to use the Japanese-Americans at Poston in "social experiments." They were to convert 25,000 acres of arid land into productive farm land that would produce surplus food to feed American troops. Collier told the internees that this experiment in communal living could raise their morale and restore their faith in democracy, and at the same time it would demonstrate to other Americans "the efficiency and splendor of the cooperative way of living."<sup>33</sup> On another level, Collier envisioned Poston becoming "a social science research laboratory" which might yield "scientific results" which could then be applied to "American administration of former Japanese islands in the Pacific Ocean."<sup>34</sup>

After a Hearst newspaper article, on 23 March 1942, alleged that evacuees would be paid more than American soldiers "fighting the country's battles overseas," Eisenhower agreed that the evacuees' income should not exceed the soldiers' base pay, which was \$21 a month. Very soon the base pay of privates rose to \$50 a month, but throughout the war the evacuee pay scale remained unchanged: \$12 for unskilled labor, \$16 for skilled labor, and \$19 for professional employees. Wages in the WRA camps were an insult to many evacuees. While a non-Japanese librarian, for example, working in the camp earned \$167 a month, her evacuee staff received no more than \$16 a month.<sup>35</sup>

Milton Eisenhower also planned to use the Japanese-American prisoners as a segregated labor force outside the camps. Soon after his appointment by Roosevelt as director of WRA, he announced, on April 2, a five-point program for the employment of Japanese-Americans, and he called for a meeting to be held at Salt Lake City on 7 April with officials of ten western States. The program that he announced included: (1) public works, such as land development, (2) agricultural production within relocation areas, (3) manufacturing within relocation areas, (4) private employment, and (5) private resettlement. At the Salt Lake City conference, Eisenhower made an attempt to integrate the Japanese-Americans into agricultural work projects outside the designated military

zones in the western states. When he suggested this plan to the governors of 10 western states on 7 April, he was surprised to learn that, with the exception of Governor Carr of Colorado, they all categorically rejected his plea to allow Japanese-Americans to relocate in their states. If the Japanese-American population represented a danger to the West Coast, the western governors argued, they also would constitute a danger to the other states. These governors wanted nothing to do with the “Japanese problem.” After this failure to create segregated work projects, permanent detention camps became the only solution until such time as new locations, outside the military zones, could be found for the tens of thousands of Japanese-American families.<sup>36</sup>

According to Mike Masaoka, who served as national secretary and “field executive” of the Japanese-American Citizens League [JACL] in 1942, Milton Eisenhower and the Army’s Western Defense Command never informed the Japanese-Americans after the 7 April meeting in Salt Lake City that they would not be allowed to permanently integrate in the western states. The agricultural project had failed.<sup>37</sup>

On 16 May 1942, Thomas W. Holland of the U.S. Department of Agriculture was appointed Employment Officer of the War Relocation Authority. He was charged with the responsibility of finding employment for camp internees “which most effectively utilize their talents in the national war program.” His efforts, however, were met with limited success. On 29 June his office announced that no more than “1,600 evacuee workers had been recruited from assembly and relocation centers to help relieve an acute labor shortage in sugar-beet areas in eastern Oregon, Utah, Idaho, and Montana.”<sup>38</sup> When given the choice, most Japanese-Americans simply refused to be exploited at substandard farm wages, even if it offered them temporary relief from concentration camp life.

#### **4. Military Uses**

In March 1942, Mike Masaoka had met with WRA director Milton Eisenhower, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, U.S. Army Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, who was in charge of the Western Defense Command’s Wartime Civil Control Administration [WCCA], and other government officials. At this meeting, the young JACL leader was assured that the camps were only a temporary measure and that citizens who cooperated with the War Department would be allowed to leave the camps immediately. “One rule that [...] I always tried to live by,” Masaoka recalled years later, “was to do what was best for the great majority of people involved. When we agreed to evacuate, we knew that it would be unpopular with many of the people [...]. But we felt as a price of leadership, and for the future, we could not afford to have the Japanese-American population

up and down the Pacific coast, at a time when Japan was scoring victories. We also did not want to refuse to obey what the Army considered—and backed by the President—necessary for the security of the country.”<sup>39</sup>

In San Jose, at a special meeting, the young JAACL leaders addressed the following letter to the Commanding General of the Fourth Army:

*If the Army would not move the Japanese, we would organize a battalion of Japanese-Americans to fight, in infantry combat, the Japanese enemy. As a hostage to our loyalty that we would not do anything to discredit the United States, we offer our parents and our families.*

The War Department’s official reply was that, “the United States Army and the U.S. government do not believe in hostages. The U.S. Army does not believe in segregated units, except for Negroes.” Then they added, “the problem of misidentification would be so great, we can’t use you, against the Japanese.”<sup>40</sup>

The date of Masaoka’s proposal to create an all-Nisei “suicide battalion”<sup>41</sup> coincided with high-level negotiations between the War Department and the White House for an early “suicide mission” on the north coast of France. Shortly before President Roosevelt appointed Milton Eisenhower as Director of the War Relocation Authority (on 18 March 1942), his younger brother, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George C. Marshall, had begun lobbying Roosevelt to authorize the use of an early “suicide mission” across the English Channel, code name Operation Sledgehammer.<sup>42</sup> According to historian Russell F. Weigley, President Roosevelt was eager to pursue the U.S. Army’s plan and bring American troops into action against Germany. On 9 March 1942, Roosevelt had cabled Prime Minister Churchill:

*I am becoming more and more interested in the establishment of a new front this summer on the European continent. And even though losses will doubtless be great, such losses will be compensated by at least equal German losses and by compelling Germans to divert large forces of all kinds from the Russian fronts.*<sup>43</sup>

The following month, in April 1942, presidential advisor Harry Hopkins and General Marshall were sent to England to promote the idea of an early “suicide invasion” of France. The British were reluctant to accept the plan, but when Roosevelt met with Foreign Minister Molotov in May, he alluded to the early cross-channel invasion that would assure Russian survival on the eastern front. Meanwhile, Marshall had sent for General Dwight D. Eisenhower, head of the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff, to join him in England to push for the early cross-channel invasion. At first British misgivings about the American plan,

prompted Eisenhower, as Commander of U.S. forces in the European Theater, to promote it all the more, according to Weigley, but eventually the British prevailed, and an alternative plan, Operation Torch, called for the Allied invasion of North Africa on 8 November 1942.<sup>44</sup>

At the same time Operation Sledgehammer was being scuttled, in June 1942, Milton Eisenhower resigned from his post as director of the War Relocation Authority. He was replaced by Dillon Myer, who pursued a new policy of “voluntary” termination of the camps, *before* the evacuees were allowed to return to their homes on the West Coast. The intent of Myer’s policy was obviously to accommodate anti-Japanese prejudices on the West Coast.<sup>45</sup>

Whereas the initial exclusion of this population from their homes on the West Coast had been based on race alone, in February 1943, Secretary of War Henry Stimson introduced loyalty questionnaires in the concentration camps, using the rubric “Application for Leave Clearance.” The War Relocation Authority now began to differentiate between those who claimed they were “loyal” to the United States and those who refused to swear loyalty. Two questions on the form were especially problematic: question number 27 was addressed to draft-age Nisei men: “Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?” Question 28 was addressed to all evacuees, both aliens and U.S. citizens alike: “Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power or organization?” The WRA would consider any qualified reply to question 28 as a failure to demonstrate “unqualified allegiance.” This army questionnaire, DSS Form 304A, bore the symbol of the Selective Service System at the top of the page, and more than 20% of the Nisei males eligible to register for the draft refused to answer yes to these two questions. They became known as “no, no boys” in the camps. One young Japanese-American evacuee, when he was told that the army wanted Nisei to volunteer for a special combat unit, replied: “What do they take us for? Saps? First, they change my army status to 4-C [unfit to serve] because of my ancestry, run me out of town, and now they want me to volunteer for a suicide squad so I could get killed for this damn democracy. That’s going some, for sheer brass!”<sup>46</sup>

The Minidoka concentration camp, in Idaho, led all the camps in the number of volunteers for the 442nd Regimental Combat Team in 1943. By 1945, there were four “6-star mothers,” who because they had six sons in the armed services were entitled to display small flags with six stars.<sup>47</sup> In contrast to the model Minidoka Camp, the Heart Mountain Camp in Wyoming identified 88 evacuees who had answered “yes” to the two

strategic questions on loyalty, but subsequently had submitted applications for conscientious objector status. They all were tried and served federal prison terms for encouraging non-cooperation with the military authorities. By the end of the war, some 300 Nisei had refused to serve in the military, and most of them had spent time in federal prisons for conspiracy to violate the Selective Service Act.<sup>48</sup>

It has long been estimated that approximately 33,000 Nisei served in the U.S. armed forces during the Second World War. A recent study suggests that this estimate is somewhat inflated, and that fewer than 27,000 Nisei actually served during the Second World War.<sup>49</sup> Those Japanese-Americans who answered “no” to questions 27 and 28 on the War Department’s questionnaire, some 4,600 evacuees, were separated from their families and friends for the remainder of the war and placed in the segregation unit, that had been built in the Tule Lake concentration camp.<sup>50</sup>

Although the original idea of a “suicide battalion” had been rejected by the War Department in the early summer of 1942, Chief of U.S. Army Staff General George C. Marshall and Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, came up with a plan to create special combat units that were totally segregated. By early 1943 recruitment began for the 100th all-Nisei Battalion and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, two Japanese-American units that offered young Japanese-Americans the opportunity to prove their “loyalty” to the United States. This military recruitment strategy was successful, and it turned out that thousands of these young men, selected in the camps and brought over from Hawaii, were willing to take extraordinary risks on the battle field to prove their unquestionable loyalty and that of their families to United States government officials.

The 442nd Regiment was commanded by Caucasian officers: General Mark W. Clark was in charge of the entire Fifth Army in Italy, and Colonel Charles Wilbur Pence was in charge of the all-Nisei 442nd. In the film, *Nisei: The Pride and The Shame*, General Clark told how his commanding officer, General George C. Marshall, had ordered him to make frequent reports on the combat capacity of the 5,000 Nisei troops attached to the Fifth Army. The Commanding General was impressed with their will to sacrifice their lives in combat, and he asked General Marshall to send him more Japanese-Americans to command: “General George C. Marshall had given me instruction,” Clark recalled after the war,

*as soon as I put them [the all-Nisei regiment] into combat, to give him an immediate report on their capacity for fighting, their loyalty [...].*

*I was utterly amazed. They were [...] willing to give their lives readily and I gave a glowing report to General Marshall and said, if you got any more send them to me. (emphasis added)<sup>51</sup>*

Receiving a steady supply of new Japanese-American volunteers, this regiment lost, in less than a year, more than 300 percent of its original number of infantry. Some 18,000 Nisei served in the unit. Of this total number, by 9 May 1945, more than 600 had been killed and almost 9,000 wounded. The 442nd Regiment was one of the most decorated combat teams in the Second World War.<sup>52</sup> One Nisei soldier commented on the high casualty rate in his segregated unit: "It was a high price to pay, [but it] was to prove our loyalty which was by no means an easy [task]."<sup>53</sup>

Young Japanese-American recruits were sent to Camp McCoy in Wisconsin for training; then on to Italy, where they suffered tremendous losses. Parents wrote their sons from concentration camps, "You owe your loyalty to our country of adoption, not birth." One survivor recalled, "I think all of us were out to prove — that we were as loyal as any other American." Sparky Matsunaga, U.S. Senator from Hawaii, remembered the low morale in the difficult Italian campaign: many men did not know what they were fighting for, but the Japanese-Americans in the 442nd did know. They were literally fighting for their freedom and that of their families in the concentration camps at home.<sup>54</sup>

By 1944, thousands of young Japanese-American men found themselves engaged in something just short of Mike Masaoka's proposed "suicide battalion." In Hawaii, where approximately 35% of the total population was of Japanese descent, 88% of the war casualties were Nisei, and 80% of Hawaii's war dead were Nisei.<sup>55</sup>

The most deadly assignment the all-Nisei 100th Battalion of the 442nd Regiment faced was in the Vosges Mountains in France, where German troops had cut off 211 men attached to the First (Texas) Battalion of the 36th Division in the 141st Infantry Regiment. The rescue of "the lost battalion" took more than three weeks. The total number of casualties in 25 days of continuous fighting, from October 15 to November 9, 1943, was 814, including 140 killed.<sup>56</sup>

The idea of creating a segregated Japanese-American combat unit appears to have been Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy's. According to Masaoka, when JAACL leadership met with McCloy and other government officials,

*they convinced us to form a segregated unit, because they told us that if the Nisei were dispersed in the regular units, no one would notice them.*

But when Masaoka later questioned Army officials about the origins of the policy of a segregated regiment, he was told, "Mike, you people asked for this unit." The former JAACL leader could not disagree that the segregated combat unit had been formed by mutual consent.<sup>57</sup>

## 5. Scientific Uses

There were three different groups of social science researchers working in the concentration camps. The largest group was employed by the federal War Relocation Authority (WRA). The War Relocation Authority Community Analysis Section, [CAS] was created in February 1943, and placed under the direction of John Embree. Its stated purpose was to furnish WRA administrators with information to enable them to administer the concentration camps efficiently.<sup>58</sup>

Their social scientific “experimentation” during the war was in part an effort to develop conceptual tools for psychological warfare campaigns against the Axis Powers, particularly against Japan. These endeavors were conducted primarily by anthropologists and led to the emergence of a new “discipline”: “national character study”. Attempts were made during this period to analyze the character structures of various nationalities, cultures, and peoples.<sup>59</sup> Observations made by “community analysts” in all ten of the concentration camps in which Japanese-Americans were incarcerated were written up and sent to Washington D.C., where they were classified in a collective portrait of “the Japanese enemy.”<sup>60</sup> Several of the social scientists gathering data in the camps went on to work directly with the psychological warfare projects pertaining to Japan.<sup>61</sup>

A second group was the Bureau of Sociological Research under the auspices of the Office of Indian Affairs at Poston. Already in March 1942, John Collier had begun to prepare his “social science research laboratory” at Poston. He appointed Lieutenant Commander Alexander H. Leighton of the U.S. Naval Reserve to direct the Bureau, the formal mission of which was “to advise administrators at the Poston camp and to formulate general principles of administration.”<sup>62</sup> Leighton, a psychiatrist and anthropologist, had served as a consultant for the Office of Indian Affairs on its Indian Personality and Research Project. He soon left this job at the Poston Relocation Center to work for the Office of War Information in Washington, D.C., as director of the Foreign Morale Analysis Division. Thirty specialists in anthropology, sociology, psychology, and Japanese language and culture worked under Leighton’s direction.

One of the most influential anthropologist working at the Foreign Morale Analysis Division was the British scientist Geoffrey Gorer. In March 1942, before the mass removal policy was fully implemented, Gorer had presented a paper before the Committee on Intercultural Relations entitled “Japanese Character Structure and Propaganda”. Gorer’s paper is described by historian John Dower as “the single most influential academic analysis of ‘Japanese character structure’ that was presented during the war.”<sup>63</sup> The work was mimeographed and distributed in March 1942, and one year later it was published by the New York Academy of Science. Gorer, who was affiliated with the Institute of Human Relations at Yale

University, had never visited Japan, neither spoke nor read Japanese, and according to his own admission had “no special qualifications for discussing Japanese culture.”<sup>64</sup> The obvious lack of credentials did not impede Gorer from publishing some of the most slanderous stereotypes against the people he professed to have studied by using a small sample of Japanese mostly from “middle and higher income groups” in cities on the northeast coast of the U.S.

Geoffrey Gorer’s description of the Japanese seemed oriented toward psychological warfare. He reported that Japanese experience “a considerable aura of fear and anxiety about the etiquette of sitting and bowing.” The parent-child relationship he described as being filled with anxiety: the parent is anxious that the child will not behave “appropriately,” and “the child is frightened that it will be punished by its parents if they are criticized.” The training of Japanese children was described as being “severe,” and the effects lasted a life time.

*In the life of Japanese children, the most consistent and most severe aspect is cleanliness training, training in control of the sphincter.  
Physical modesty, as an absolute, is not inculcated by the Japanese (except that they should not be seen defecating).*

The Japanese were described as being lewd. A major portion of their “most refined graphic arts” were “so pornographic that much of it has never been seen in Europe or America.” Obscene words are used by children, and adults exposed more of their bodies than was acceptable in European-American culture.

Gorer attributed the absence of the concept of “sin”—“no ‘right’ or ‘wrong,’ but instead very strong emphasis on doing the right thing at the right time”—to early Japanese toilet training, coupled with promiscuous sexual habits of Japanese children. “Where infantile sexuality is prohibited [and] there are no places and no occasions when a child is allowed to strive for whatever sexual pleasure is physiologically possible for him”:

*There would appear always to be moral absolutes in the value system of the society: absolute prohibitions, absolute sins, a concept of absolute evil, a constant contrast between the unreachable ideal (of purity in the first place) and actual mundane practice.*

The loose sexual mores of the Japanese did not train children to think “pure” thoughts and strive for “perfection.” But the toilet training of Japanese babies created symptoms of a “compulsive neurotic” character.

*Excretion [...] cannot be absolutely forbidden; all that can be forbidden is excretion at the wrong time or in the wrong place. If this cleanliness training*

*lies at the bottom of the value system of the society, it would follow that there would be no absolutes, no "right" or "wrong," but instead very strong emphasis on [...] "correct" or "suitable" behavior, which would be defined by the context in which the behavior took place. This would seem to fit the case of Japan.*

This "scientific" study of Japanese character was presented only a few weeks after President Roosevelt had signed Executive Order 9066. It was on the eve of the Evacuation. The thrust of the report was to assert that the Japanese were untrustworthy and by their very nature predisposed to violence and deceit.

For some reason Gorer's academic paper which was presented before the Committee on Intercultural Relations in March 1942, under the title "Japanese Character Structure and Propaganda" quickly caught the attention of the popular press. It became very influential in framing subsequent studies of the "Japanese Character" at the time of the forced removal and later after the unconditional surrender of Japan. Gorer's theories were nothing more than a "hodge podge of social anthropology, psychoanalysis and stimulus-response psychology" but nevertheless influenced the thinking of a large number of Americans, both academics and amateur psychologists.<sup>65</sup>

The Japanese-American Evacuation and Relocation Study [JERS] was a third group of social scientists which conducted research in these concentration camps, under the Direction of Dorothy Thomas. The JERS project was especially significant for two reasons: first this research set "the initial academic framework" for future books on the Japanese-American forced removal and internment, and, second, it generated a large collection of "daily journals, diaries, life histories, field reports, and documents" beginning in the spring of 1942, when the forced removal first got under way.<sup>66</sup>

Thomas obtained funding for the project from three major sources: the Rockefeller Foundation, the Columbia Foundation, and the Giannini Foundation together with the University of California. Thomas applied for these grants in early March 1942, and later that same month she arranged to meet with Milton Eisenhower, who had recently been appointed director of WRA and was visiting San Francisco to gather first-hand information on the Japanese-American population. Thomas solicited Eisenhower's endorsement of her research proposal, and in mid-May, Eisenhower notified the Rockefeller Foundation that WRA would cooperate with the JERS project. From that moment, generous funding for JERS was assured, with "no strings attached," according to Thomas.

Thomas came to JERS with a knowledge of statistical analysis, with the experience of having worked on Gunnar Myrdal's "revisionist" sociology project, and an intimate knowledge of behaviorist theory. Initially,

Thomas had conceived of JERS as a study of “enforced mass migration,” in contrast to the voluntary migration she had studied before. In her research application for Rockefeller Foundation funding, Thomas proposed that if JERS could discover general principles governing the forced migration of Japanese-Americans, such principles could be applied in post-war Europe, where “enforced mass migrations” would be necessary to rectify population imbalances caused by the war. She wrote that “the administrative and research personnel of the University of California are interested in — providing a documentary account and an analysis of an important sociological event, which they believe will be the precursor of other enforced mass migrations.” In this grant proposal, she emphasized the “scientific objectivity” of the study, and she assured the Rockefeller Foundation board that JERS “is in no way connected with the interests of the administration of individual faculty members *in the welfare of the Japanese group as a whole or of the students of Japanese ancestry.*” [emphasis added]

Thomas came into repeated conflict with her staff for not providing theoretical guidelines for the concentration camp research. One young field worker wrote her, “we must have some notion of what we are looking for and some preparation *before we begin our investigation.*” [original emphasis] Thomas scolded the “negative” and “disruptive” field worker. She wrote that sociologists were “perhaps the worst offenders of all” social scientists wishing to construct “unrealistic and fanciful theories.” In a memorandum, written in October 1943, she restated the basic goal of JERS:

*The primary purpose is not at all mysterious. A Minority group was, in a period of crisis, forcibly uprooted en masse [under-line included], and forcibly concentrated in camps. Later, part of the group was forcibly segregated, and the other part was permitted to disperse and resettle. The purpose of the study then is to collect, organize, and analyze ‘relevant’ data on a) the nature of the restrictions that were imposed on the group; b) how the persons affected behaved under these restrictions and after the restrictions were removed.*

Thomas’ refusal to state explicitly any theoretical guidelines that might make data “relevant,” led to the adoption of ad hoc theory, by default. Thomas used an early report provided by a group of field workers at the Tanforan concentration camp in June 1942 as a model for all future reports.

Embedded in this report were a host of implicit social theories and hypotheses. This model report described concentration camp life under three distinct headings: administrative organization, social organization, and social maladjustments. The first heading included the physical facilities and administrative organization at Tanforan. Family, religion, recreation,

social and political groups, education, and economic activities fell under the second heading. The third heading included intra-group conflicts, sexual problems, theft, delinquency, poverty, and individual deviance. The field workers who produced this original report asked Thomas that it be restricted to JERS staff members only, but she ignored their request and distributed copies to all JERS field workers, recommending it as a model for their own reports.

This framework of reporting from the concentration camps would continue until late 1942, when spontaneous strikes, violence, and protest demonstrations erupted in the camps at Poston, Gila River, Tule Lake, and Manzanar. Field workers recognized the political significance of the change, and they began to concentrate on the causes of the conflict between the inmates and camp administrators.

When WRA established the Community Analysis Section in February 1943, as a result of political protests at Poston and Manzanar in November and December 1942, John Embree, head of the newly created section, instructed his WRA subordinate, Solom Kimball, to visit Thomas once a week, to “examine documents and question [her] about ‘unwritten’ materials.” At first Thomas did not consent to provide Embree and his staff with copies of JERS reports. Above all, she wished to protect the safety of her field workers and the confidentiality of camp informants. Eventually, Thomas compromised with WRA administrators, and signed an agreement that would allow government officials access to information taken in the camps. She promised to provide WRA’s Community Analysis Section with monthly reports, relaying “significant findings of [JERS] field workers.” She, also, agreed to hold periodic briefings with WRA administrators, “concerning [JERS] field data,” and she allowed of JERS field workers “to cooperate informally with any social analysis that may be undertaken by WRA.”

Thomas’ collaboration with camp administrators may have begun as early as December 1942. The full extent of the WRA-JERS collaboration cannot, however, be fully documented until all field reports are made available to the public, which will occur sometime after the turn of the next century.<sup>67</sup>

John Embree, an anthropologist chosen to head the Community Analysis Section at WRA made a contribution to the war effort in his study of Japanese character published in 1943, and reviewed in the August issue of *The New York Times Magazine* under the rubric, “Jap Bullies.”

*The anthropologists tell us why the Jap soldier is a truculent and vengeful bully. From his birth his mother pets him inordinately until the arrival of his little sister, after which she dismisses him as her chief interest in life and hands him over to the indifferent care of servants. It injures his nervous system at a critical time in his development and he never gets over the shock.<sup>68</sup>*

Although eager to “explain” Japanese inferiority to Americans, Embree was critical of those members of his staff who entertained more extreme “solutions” to the “Japanese problem”. In his note on the Heart Mountain report from the Community Analysis Section, July 31-August 1943, Embree wrote, “Some staff members have no business on a relocation project. One man, for instance, recommended that the repatriates be castrated before being returned to Japan.”<sup>69</sup>

Rosalie Wax worked as a field worker under Dorothy Thomas at JERS. As an ambitious graduate student from the University of California at Berkeley, she described feeling somewhat ill-at-ease gathering data on the attitudes of Japanese-American prisoners. Thomas had emphasized that field workers should try to win the confidence of the concentration camp inmates by assuring them that none of the information they gathered would be shared with WRA administrators. Years later in her book, *Doing Fieldwork, Warnings and Advice*, Wax described the moral crisis she experienced:

*Being a raw newcomer, terribly anxious to behave like a social scientist, I did not realize that it was stupid and callous to ask these harassed folk to express their views about the U.S. to a stranger who might well be a spy for the administration.[...] But if I acted like a decent human being and left them alone, how was I to earn my salary as a researcher?<sup>70</sup>*

Rosalie Wax succumbed to her “calling” and successfully conducted the research she was employed to perform. She eventually used her intimate relationships, as a “participant/observer” in the Tule Lake concentration camp, to serve as an informer for the FBI.<sup>71</sup>

The forced removal and incarceration of Japanese-Americans had a severely disorienting impact on their lives. Daisuke Kitagawa tells us the impact was especially severe for Issei men over the age of 50.<sup>72</sup> The breakdown of morale soon spread to “all areas of camp life.” The victims lost their sense of reality, and rumors, no matter how fantastic, were easily believed. Alienation between the generations was a further sign of deterioration of community in the camps. Kitagawa recounted how a cruel game was introduced into the camp by the young internees “trading on the gullibility of the Issei community. They would plant a rumor at one end of the center, then wait to see how fast it could travel and how big it could swell by the time it reached the other end.”<sup>73</sup>

The uprooted and persecuted prisoners in these camps were further tormented by “Scientific” experimentations and observations. One psychiatrist observed in a camp that Japanese behavior conformed to “clinical samples of adolescent immaturity—vacillation between different attitudes, differing emotional reactions, the use of fantasy, and the disorganization of the personality.”<sup>74</sup> Historian Frank Tannenbaum claimed

he had found “twenty-eight points of analogy between Japanese behavior and the ‘character structure of the American gangster’.” Anthropologists Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson wrote that the Japanese lacked self-respect and suffered from feelings of inferiority.

Reverend Willis Lamott’s book *Nippon*, in 1944, and Weston LaBarre’s influential article “Some Observations on Character Structure in the Orient,” published in the August 1945, issue of *Psychiatry* were both based on observations of incarcerated Japanese-Americans. Both the Christian missionary and the “scientist” concluded that the Japanese were “collectively ill.”

LaBarre’s work is a first class example of anthropology in the service of propaganda and psychological warfare. Consciously ignoring the contextual history of the prisoners he observed for one week at Topaz, LaBarre produced nineteen “abnormal traits” of “the typical Japanese character structure”:

*secretiveness, hiding of emotions and attitudes, preservation and persistency, conscientiousness, self-righteousness, a tendency to project attitudes, fanaticism, arrogance, “touchiness,” precision and perfectionism, neatness and ritualistic cleanliness, ceremoniousness, conformity to rule, sadomasochistic behavior, hypochondriasis, suspiciousness, jealousy and enviousness, pedantry, sentimentality, love of scatological obscenity and anal sexuality.*

These nineteen traits that LaBarre imagined to belong to all Japanese were based on observations of a group of prisoners whom he had observed for one week at Topaz. The real context of these observations is not described in LaBarre’s “Scientific” report. Topaz was an extraordinarily ugly camp of tar-paper barracks, without trees, in a climate of extreme heat and cold. Nor does the immediate history of the camp pollute LaBarre’s “pure Science.” Seven months before LaBarre’s arrival, the compulsory loyalty oath questionnaire was administered to the prisoners causing much distress, and one month before his arrival, on April 11, 1943, sixty-three year old Issei man, James Hatsuaki Wakasa, was shot dead by a guard when he wandered too close to the barbed wire fence which surrounded the camp. A mass protest produced a court martial, but the guard was acquitted. One week after LaBarre had assumed his position at Topaz there was another shooting on May 20, as a guard fired a warning shot at a couple strolling “too close to the fence.” Finally, LaBarre saw but never mentioned the protest movement around the closing of the day-care center which had served the needs of forty-five pre-schoolers.<sup>75</sup> Peter Suzuki describes LaBarre’s article as “intellectually inadequate” and as representing “the nadir in publications on WRA internees by Community Analysts and former Community Analysts.”<sup>76</sup>

Willis Lamott's book, *Nippon*, was written in the same vein as LaBarre's article. Lamott, a missionary who had lived in Japan, spent much time during the war years interpreting the Japanese character to Americans. In his book, *Nippon*, he reaffirmed the stereotype that all Americans had been bludgeoned with since the beginning of the war. Joining the chorus of psychological jargon, Lamott wrote, "Modern Japan is undeniably a psychological case. Her national psychosis, her neurosis, her schizophrenia, and her paranoia have been described so many times already as to make repetition unnecessary. Call it what you will, her mental condition is abnormal."<sup>77</sup>

The terminology of social science was popularized across America, and the stigmatization of the Japanese received an official endorsement. During the war, applied social scientists received "unprecedented government support and public attention." The war offered a unique opportunity for academics to get out of the classroom and wed their theories to a cause which seemed at once noble and profitable.<sup>78</sup>

The U.S. concentration camps were organized on the colonial model. Harry Kitano writes that the standard camp administrative setup was "white on the top" and "yellow on the bottom." Bureaucrats in Washington, D.C. made the major decisions and delegated authority to lower camp officials, who were also white. The actual enforcement of camp policy was the responsibility of designated Japanese-American prisoners. It was a closed system, and a classless system, without democracy, where very few alternative activities existed and where wages brought little distinction.<sup>79</sup>

In a famous report addressed to the Social Science Research Council in 1948, Talcott Parsons lauded the achievements of social science and particularly that of psychology during World War II.<sup>80</sup>

By the end of the Second World War, social science had gained considerable prestige. Talcott Parsons became a major influence in the study of "underdeveloped nations" at the end of the War. Working with other sociologists, Parsons attempted to identify a series of "evolutionary universals," which would delineate stages of social evolution. His "stages of growth" theory, which posited the existence of the dichotomy: "traditional/modern," assumed that all societies were alike at one stage (i.e. traditional) and that they would eventually pass through the same changes to become "modern."<sup>81</sup>

This simplistic theory, which assumes a single paradigm for social knowledge and is based on absolute faith in the "neutrality" of science, pretends that all societies have a common starting place and tend toward a common destiny. Such assumptions played a role in the research activities in U.S. concentration camp, where social scientists began to see themselves in the career of midwife, serving those groups still hampered by "backward traditional behavior."

## Conclusion

The results of concentration camps in U.S. society were very different from the Nazi experience. What began as a repressive measure to isolate “undesirable” people evolved, in Germany, into a policy of total control and extermination. In the United States, the sudden violence of the forced removal policy was harnessed by the Department of Interior, which sought to create new agricultural communities, and the Department of War, which sought to recruit soldiers for particularly dangerous duty abroad.

How can we accurately describe the function of American concentration camps? In many ways it was the experimental extension of the Indian reservations, where native Americans could be trained to become like “good white citizens”. It was, also, the antecedent of the “strategic hamlets,” conceived by Stanford University economist Eugene Staley and organized in South Vietnam by the U.S. Army during the war, and, more recently, the *pueblos de desarrollo* (the model villages) supported by the U.S. Department of Defense in the Philippines and in Central America. The use of concentration camps as a tool for social control and indoctrination has a long and illustrative history in the annals of modern civilization.

Despite the great differences between Nazi concentration camps and those used in the United States during the Second World War, I have argued that both nations initially conceived of concentration camps for similar purposes. Whereas the systematic human degradation associated with German concentration camps (which included grisly biological experiments) ultimately produced a policy of extermination, the U.S. concentration camps became sites for experiments in social engineering, directed toward patriotism and forced assimilation. In both these cases, cultural diversity was held suspect by the state, and a general climate of extreme intolerance for cultural differences gave rise to the desire to “perfect” society, by ridding it of its undesirable traits. In U.S. concentration camps, officials sought to eliminate unacceptable behavioral traits; in the case of Nazi Germany, the prisoners themselves were to be eliminated.

The so-called “objective” scientific studies of behavior in U.S. concentration camps were ill-conceived and fraudulent. By today’s standards, the social scientists who gathered and analyzed data from the camps failed to produce a significant body of knowledge because they had denied their own subjective role and influence as “witnesses”. Eager to please state authorities, social scientists donned a cloak of neutrality and pretended to be objective. As a result they contributed to the repression of prisoners rather than arming them to defend themselves against the immanent power of the state and preparing them to ultimately reappropriate this power for their own liberation.

The use of concentration camps in America introduced methods of control that would reappear later during the Cold War. The House Select Committee on Un-American Activities [known in the early 1940s as the Tolan Committee, named after its chairman John Tolan, Republican congressman from California] was called to the West Coast to investigate this ethnic group accused of disloyalty. Later, loyalty oaths were introduced in the camps to better control the suspects. Patriotism and self-sacrifice were extolled in the camps in an effort to indoctrinate the prisoners along the lines of nationalism and militarism. Similar methods would be used during the Cold War, to control the American labor movement, and identify unacceptable employees in the U.S. government.<sup>82</sup> It was this cultural milieu that gave rise to the popular slogan, "Better dead than red!" in the 1950s. Later, during the Vietnam War, "Love it or leave it!" became the cultural expression of the national security state. Like the Nisei in the 1940s, all American dissidents in the 1950s and 60s had become the equivalent of "non-aliens," liable to some form of deportation. Once again, it was an assault on the culture and the intelligence of its victims, and a violence once again perpetrated "for reason of state."<sup>83</sup>

At the time of the Iran/Contra Affair, in 1987, the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], primarily in charge of taking care of victims of disasters, such as floods, fires, and hurricanes, was responsible for contingency plans to round up Central American revolutionaries and radical sympathizers in the United States, because of government fears that the Reagan policy in Nicaragua would provoke mass demonstrations in the United States. There was a telling moment in 1987, when national security advisor Colonel Oliver North testified before televised Congressional Investigative Committee Hearings, and a question related to the secret activities of FEMA was raised by Congressman Jack Brooks of Texas. Ironically, discussion of this issue was abruptly halted by Senator Daniel Inouye, the Japanese-American World War II hero from Hawaii, who presided over these hearings. It was Inouye who prevented public discussion of FEMA's activities in preparing the re-opening of American concentration camps because such discussion, he warned, would compromise "national security."<sup>84</sup>

Again, in 1991, the specter of American concentration camps arose when Representative Newt Gingrich and Senator Phil Gramm cosponsored Congressional Bill HR 4097, which, if passed, would have reopened the Japanese internment camps; declared a five-year national state of emergency to round up tens of thousands of illegal drug users by creating mandatory drug testing for everyone above junior high school age; and placed these offenders in these camps with "no right to appeal" if they were using drugs again.<sup>85</sup>

The experience of Japanese-Americans during the Second World War offers important lessons. Today, the exceptional vulnerability of minority groups is being contested by the multicultural movement in America. The history of state policies that have been based on racial discrimination reveals a complexity of implications. Simplistic notions such as the idea that U.S. concentration camps represented only a brief interval when a few thousand families were deprived of their civil liberties during the war, or the illusion that what happened in Nazi Germany was unique and could never happen elsewhere, or belief that civil liberties must always be subordinated to the state in time of war—these ahistorical notions can only serve to blind us to the important lessons that are embedded in the history of the uses of Japanese-Americans in U.S. concentration camps.<sup>86</sup>

## Notes

1. There are only two published works describing military detention camps used by the U.S. Department of Defense in the summer of 1942. See Anthony L. Lehman, *Birthright of Barbed Wire: The Santa Anita Assembly Center for the Japanese* (Los Angeles: Westernlore Press, 1970), and Francis Feeley, *Strategy of Dominance, the History of an American Concentration Camp (Pomona, California)* (New York: Brandywine Press, 1995).
2. Ten World War II

<i>WRA Camps:</i>	<i>Opened</i>	<i>Closed</i>	<i>Maximum population</i>
Gila River, Arizona	07/20/42	11/10/45	13,348
Granada, Colorado	08/24/42	10/15/45	7,318
Heart Mountain, Wyoming	08/12/42	11/10/45	10,767
Jerome, Arkansas	10/06/42	06/30/44	8,497
Manzanar, California	06/01/42	11/21/45	10,046
Minidoka, Idaho	08/10/42	08/28/45	9,397
Poston, Arizona	05/08/42	11/28/45	17,814
Rohwer, Arkansas	09/18/42	11/30/45	8,475
Topaz, Utah	09/11/42	10/31/45	8,130
Tule Lake, California	05/27/42	03/20/46	18,789

*Source:* Roger Daniels, et al., *Japanese-Americans, from Relocation to Redress* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994), p. xxi.

3. John Tateishi, "An Interview with Mike Masaoka on WW 2 JACL Actions," in *Pacific Citizen*, Vol.93, No. 25, December 18-25, 1981, p. 75.
4. According to historian Michi Weglyn, 90% of the property losses suffered by Japanese-American civilians in 1942 remain "unrecovered." See Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy* (New York: 1976), p. 276.

5. Daniels, *op. cit.*, p. 225.
6. The Department of Justice is still seeking some 3,000 persons who were registered in the camps but who have not contacted the Department of Justice Office of Redress. Also, there remain some 1,000 camp survivors from South America who have not received financial compensation. Their case is presently being heard in Washington, D.C. courts.
7. See: Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore* (New York: Penguin Books, 1989); Roger Daniels, et al., *Japanese-Americans, from Relocation to Redress* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994); Yuji Ichioka, *Views from Within* (Los Angeles: UCLA Press, 1989); John Modell, *The Economics and Politics of Racial Accommodation* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1977).
8. Walter C. McKain, Jr., "When the Japanese Return to California," a report for the U.S. Government Bureau of Agricultural Economics, dated December 26, 1944. The Carey McWilliams Collection, Box 5, Folder 6. See also Francis Feeley, "Japanese-Americans: A Legacy of Injustice," *Journal of the West* (Kansas State University Press, October 1993).
9. Yoshiko Uchida, *Desert Exile, The Uprooting of a Japanese-American Family*, (Seattle, Wash., 1982) p. 42. "Nisei": second generation Japanese-Americans, who were U.S. citizens by birth ; "Issei": first generation immigrants born in Japan, most of whom came to the United States as single men, then married Japanese picture brides and had children late in life.
10. Michi Weglyn, *op. cit.*, p. 38. See, also, the account of California's Attorney General Earl Warren meeting with state sheriffs on February 2, 1942, in *Personal Justice Denied*, p. 81. Warren, of course, was the Democratic Party's candidate for the post of governor of California in the 1942 elections, which he won in November.
11. Arthur Hansen and Betty Mitson, *Voices Long Silent: An Oral Inquiry into the Japanese-American Evacuation* (Fullerton, CA, 1974), p. 29.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
13. Bill Hosokawa, *Nisei: The Quiet Americans* (New York, 1969), p. 251.
14. Roger Daniels, "Relocation, Redress, and the Report: A Historical Appraisal" in *Japanese-Americans, From Relocation to Redress*, ed. by Roger Daniels, et al. (Salt Lake City, 1994), p. 6.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Weglyn, *op. cit.*, p. 71-72.
17. Jacques Le Goff cited by François Bédarida in "L'histoire, entre science et mémoire?" in *Science Humaines*, No. 59 (Paris, March 1996), p. 13.
18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
20. In the United States eugenics laws were being widely applied by 1907 and continued to be through the 1930s. (See Leon J. Kamin, "Some Historical Facts About I.Q. Testing," in *Designer Genes, IQ, Ideology, and Biology*, ed. by Chee Heng Leng & Chan Chee Khoon, Selangor, Malaysia, 1984, p. 78.)
21. Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan* (New York, 1985), p. 3. Also, see Morton Grodzin, *Americans Betrayed* (Chicago, 1949), p. 418.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Drinnon, p. 36.
25. See Weglyn, *op. cit.*
26. Walter Lippmann's "liberal" view of the Japanese-American menace to national security, such as his article published in the *Washington Post*, February 12, 1942, calling for mass evacuation of the West Coast, was influential in mobilizing prejudice against this group. His "Fifth Column" article was circulated in the War Department and most probably read by President Roosevelt. (See Daniels, p. 48.)
27. François Bédarida, "Bilan et signification de quarante années de travail historique" in *La politique nazie d'extermination* (Paris, 1989), pp. 16-17.
28. Primo Levi in *Si c'est un homme* (1987) cited by François Bédarida, *Le génocide et le nazisme* (Paris, 1992), p. 230.
29. Bédarida seems to express a similar view in his article (See "L'histoire, entre science et mémoire?", *op. cit.*, p. 11).
30. Michi Weglyn, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.
31. Kenneth Philp, *John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform* (Tucson, Az., 1977), pp. 208-209.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 209.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*
35. See *Personal Justice Denied*, pp. 166-167. Also, Lane Ryo Hirabayashi discusses the low pay Japanese-Americans received in *Inside An American Concentration Camp*, p. 39, footnote #4.
36. Government Printing Office, "A Chronology of Evacuation and Relocation," p. 3, attached to the "Quarterly Report of the War Relocation Authority," dated March 18 to June 30, 1942. N/A RG 210, Box 469, F. 71.407.
37. Tateishi, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
38. Government Printing Office, "Chronology", *op. cit.*, p. 5.
39. Tateishi, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

41. The first use of the term “suicide” is not clear. Michi Weglyn uses the term in her book, *Years of Infamy* (1976). Also, Stephen E. Ambrose uses the term in his book *Rise to Globalism* (sixth edition, 1991), as does Russel F. Weigley in *The American Way of War* (1973). Obviously, it was not in the interest of the War Department to employ the term, nor did the JACL leaders publicly use this terminology.
42. Stephen Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, sixth edition, (New York, 1991) pp. 20-22. See also Weglyn, *op. cit.*, p. 135.
43. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington, 1973), p. 318.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 319-322.
45. Dillon Myer abandoned the project of creating agricultural communities and instead pursued a new policy of pressuring Japanese-Americans to leave the camps and individually settle elsewhere than their original homes. See Richard Drinnon, *Keeper of Concentration Camps, Dillon S. Myer and American Racism* (Los Angeles, 1987).
46. Cited in Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore* (New York, 1989), p. 398. The Selective Service questionnaire used for this questionnaire was pointed out in a personal communication with Jack and Aiko Herzig, dated April 14, 1997.
47. Robert C. Sims, “Japanese-Americans in Idaho,” in *Japanese-Americans, From Relocation to Redress*, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
48. Takaki, *op. cit.*, pp. 398-399.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 399.
50. According to Takaki, the “no-no boys” represented about 22% of the 21,000 Nisei population in the camps who were eligible for the draft. (Takaki, p. 397).
51. See documentary film, *Nisei: The Pride and The Shame*, (n.d.). George C. Marshall was credited for influencing the policy in Hawaii. According to Roger Daniels, he and his protégé, Gen. Delos E. Emmons, were opposed to the forced removal of the Hawaiian Japanese. They argued that the removal of this population into camps was not necessary. See Daniels, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
52. Also, see Orville C. Shirey’s book, *Americans, The Story of the 442d Combat Team* (Washington, D.C., 1946), pp. 27, 93 and 101.
53. *Personal Justice Denied*, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-259. Also see Anne Reeploeg Fisher, *Exile of a Race*, (Seattle, 1965), p. 32.
54. *Personal Justice Denied*, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-259. Barbara Tanabe, *Song of the Imin* (Hawaii, 1985), video tape produced for KHON Television.
55. According to historian Andrew Lind, cited in Weglyn, pp. 48-49.
56. *Personal Justice Denied*, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-259.
57. Tateishi, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

58. Yuji Ichioka, "JERS Revisited: Introduction," in *Views from Within: The Japanese-American Evacuation and Resettlement Study*, ed. by Yuji Ichioka (Los Angeles, 1989), pp. 3-4.
59. Peter T. Suzuki, "A Retrospective Analysis of a Wartime 'National Character' Study," in *Dialectical Anthropology*, vol.5, no. 1, May 1980, p. 33.
60. John Dower, *War Without Mercy, Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York, 1987) p. 132.
61. *Ibid.*
62. George Foster, *Applied Anthropology* (Boston, 1969) p. 34. See also Alexander Leighton's *Governing of Men* (Princeton, 1945).
63. Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, New York, 1946, p. 292.
64. Geoffrey Gorer, "Themes of Japanese Culture," in *Transactions of the New York Academy of Science* (1943) vol. 5, Series 2, p. 106-18. All quotes from this article.
65. John Dower, *War Without Mercy*, New York, 1986, pp. 124 & 131.
66. Ichioka, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-16. Elements about Dorothy Thomas come from this source, unless otherwise specified.
67. Bancroft Library has restricted Rosalie Wax's (née Hankey) papers until the year 2008. [See Ichioka, *op. cit.*, note no. 41, p. 26.]
68. Ichioka, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
69. Suzuki (1980) *op. cit.*, p. 45.
70. Rosalie Wax, *Doing Fieldwork, Warnings and Advice* (Chicago, 1971) p. 71.
71. Peter Suzuki, "The University of California Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study: A Prolegomenon," in *Dialectical Anthropology*, 1986, vol.10, pp. 193-94.
72. Daisuke Kitagawa, *Issei and Nisei, The Internment Years* (New York, 1974), pp. 91-92.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
74. Dower, *op. cit.*, p.132-136. All following elements from this source, unless otherwise specified.
75. Suzuki (1980) *op. cit.*, p. 40.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
77. Cited in Dower, *op. cit.*, p. 135.
78. *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119.
79. Daniels, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
80. Samuel Z. Klausner & Victor M. Lidz, eds., *The Nationalization of the Social Sciences*, (Philadelphia, 1986) p. 62.
81. Ian Roxborough, *Theories of Underdevelopment* (London, 1979), pp. 13-14.

82. Noam Chomsky, *On Power and Ideology* (Boston, 1987), pp. 54-55. Chomsky discusses the history of camps “surrounded by barbed wire and [where] the security forces would be able to go and pick out the dangerous people.”
83. Ambrose, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-310.
84. See the documentary video, *Cover up, Behind the Iran Contra Affair*, produced by Barbara Trent and written by Eve Goldberg, 1988.
85. Noam Chomsky, cited by Francis Feeley, *Strategy of Dominance*, *op. cit.* p. 115.
86. In fact, the collaboration of social scientists with the forced removal and incarceration of Americans of Japanese descent living on the West Coast continues to be an unexamined issue except for the very important writings of Peter T. Suzuki and Orin Starn. To this day, the issues have generated almost no serious self-examination from the participant-observers themselves.